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PREFACE 
He who has Ber l in , has Germany; 
He who has Germany, has Europe. 
--Lenin 
This statement might be a good introduction to my 
reasons for studying West German foreign policy. Since 
the time of Napolean and the end of the Holy Roman Empire, 
ambi tious leaders hoping to control the European continent 
have looked with wishful eyes on this centralize European 
country. Being a crossroads from East to West and North 
to South in the continent , the German people have contin-
ually been exposed to different rulers and new ideas . The 
populace of this part of Europe has , since the rise of 
modern nation- s tate s ,  participated in most of the major 
events in European hi story: the social revolutions o f  
1830 and 1848; the struggle for sovereignty and nationalism 
of the late nineteenth century ; both o f  the world wars 
of the twentieth century. Even after the defeat of Naziism 
in 1945 , Germany has been an actor in the Cold War and i n  
today ' s  detente. The mili taristic and disciplined mind of 
Frederick the Grea t ,  the calcula ted unification and recog-
nition of a strong Germany wrought by Otto von Bismarck , 
and the unprecedented terror struck by Adol f  Hitler all 
serve as predecessors to the importance o f  modern Germany. 
i i  
Looking back over her pas t ,  i t  i s  not really too surpri s ing 
that Germany should be an active participant in the present 
detente in Europe. 
In the process of writing this paper I must recognize,  
above all other people, my wif� Rita,  who has endured not 
only many hardships while I worked on this study but also 
the wrath of a frustrated political science graduate student 
during his perplexing moments of writing a thesis • . Recog­
nition must also be given to Dr. John R. Faust, my advisor 
and guiding light throughout this work, and to Dr . Laurence 
C. Thorsen of the Department of Political Science ·and Dr.  
Wolfgang T.  Schlauch of the Department of History, who, 
as members of my thesis committee and as individual s ,  have 
provided me with direction and inspiration as a student of 
German affairs. 
Eastern I l linois University 
August, 1974 
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James E .  Getz 
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CHAPTER I 
BASIC PURPOSES OF THE STUDY 
This work i s designed to study Ostpolitik,  .the foreign 
policy of the Federal Republ ic of Germany towards Eastern 
Europe in particular , set within a current framework of 
the body of knowledge in the field of international 
relations set forth by scholars in recent decades. Although 
Ostpo l i ti k  l i terally translated means " Eastern politics" 
and could refer to the relations of West Germany with any 
country to the East of the Federal Republic itsel f ,  this 
study will limit itself to foreign affairs with Eastern 
Europe ( including the Soviet Union ) .  The reason for this 
is to present a topic of a broad spectrum following a 
somewhat narrow line. This may seem to defeat its own 
purpose and it will indeed present some problems and/or 
inadequacies in the study. I t  wi l l ,  however , achieve the 
goal o f  simplifying an enormous topic to the point that i t  
may be examined in an orderly fashion without being burdened 
w i th tangents. To study Ostpo l i tik in i ts entirety would 
be to risk accomplishing nothing meaningful .  The purpo s e ,  
a s stated above, i s  not to result in revelations concerning 
Ostpol i t i k ,  but merely to try to place i ts study in an 
orderly framework. 
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To a participant or an observer the study of inter­
national relations may appear to lack a measurable degree 
of conformity in the development of a framework for the 
analysis of events and data. This could be considered as 
somewhat valid for other areas of political studies but , 
this of ten appears to be exceptionally true in the case of 
relations amongst state s .  When studying two countries 
simultaneous ly , as opposed to one political entity , there 
are often more variables which must be accounted for . One 
of these variables involves two completely dif ferent 
political systems each composed of different parts and 
factors. Much of what is known of the study of international 
rel ations could possibly be criticized as being on the verge 
of journal i stic rather than academic. Much of this criticism 
from new political scientists would probably be due to a 
lack of hard data; again , the problem of quantifying data 
using more than one set of variables . The study of in ter­
national relations does appear, however, to have a lack of 
sense of direction generally accepted by the scholars in 
the field. This can be exemplified by viewing the contrast­
ing area of political behavior , which i s  at least partially 
more " scienti fic" in its theoretical foundations. While 
most scholars in pol i tical behavior would probably agree 
on the usefulness of quantitative data resulting from 
surveys , questionaires , interviews, etc. , scholars in the 
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field of international relations cannot agree on a basic 
starting point. Some believe a macroanalysis of power 
poli tics is the best route to follow while others believe 
a systems approach or a microanalysis to be more valuable. 
As yet, the problem remains ; there is a very small amount 
of common foundation in these varying theories of analys is.  
Because of this lack of continuity i n  the basic framework, 
the objective determination of one method of analysis being 
superior to another is virtually impossible. Therefore , 
the choice of methodology i s  necessarily made on the 
criteria of which theory would provide more utility for 
the purposes of the individual study. 
It is extremely doubtful ,  upon studying Ostpolitik, 
that any single theory on the study o f  international 
relations is the "right" approach , or that, taken by itsel f ,  
i t  will yield a true picture o f  the phenomena i t  probe s .  
Even though any single approach might be helpful to the 
researcher, i t  would probably be inadequate in explaining 
a specific segment of international rel ations--in this case, 
Ostpolitik. Indeed , many contending theories are useful 
for the examipation of Ostpolitik, yet .they are inadequate 
as explanatory tools for rendering the present material on 
Ostpoli tik more relevant. This lack of conformity of 
international relations theorists , when coupled with a basic 
lack of direction on the part of the writers on the subject 
-� 
i ts e l f ,  provides for an obscure picture of Ostpo l i tik in 
the international scene. Some works of authors on the 
subject might also be characterized as being journa l i s t i c ,  
even though the intent may be scholarly. In shor t ,  the 
l i terature on West Germany ' s  Eastern policy needs to be 
placed in the perspective of a theoretical framework for 
it to be related properly to international relations 
in general .  
In order for a propo s i tion to be tested with any 
degree of continuity there must be some standard of analysis 
and theoretical framework prescribed. Results of this 
paper would be useless if i t  utili zed an entirely new 
approach without taking previous studies into account. 
Therefore, this study w ill utilize a synthesis of the 
theories of two conflicting scholars of international 
relations . Nei ther Hans J .  Morgenthau nor David Easton, 
the two theorists chosen her e ,  have written anything 
directly related to Ostpolitik,  but on the other hand , 
both are wel l-known for their work in international 
relations--Morgenthau for his historical interpretations 
and Easton for his systems work. Both theorists uti l i z e  
a sort of macro approach-to the different aspects o f  the 
field ; they both deal to a great extent in a generali zed 
theory which might be all- inclusive. Morgenthau relies on 
a power or balance of power concept tending to support his 
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preconceived ideas of power politics s i tuation with h i s tori-
cal evidence. With the current literature on Ostpolitik 
being of primarily a descriptive nature , the analytical 
methods of Morgenthau lend themselves to the intent of this 
research. This does not, however , mean that Morgenthau ' s  
h i s torical methods are sufficient to give an adequate 
description of Ostpolitik. As stated earlier , the analysis 
of this sub j ect through only one theoretical approach i s  
not the most fruitful . For this reason , the methodology 
of David Easton wi ll  also be used. 
Easton contras t s ,  and therefore counterbalances , 
Morgenthau in that he deals with the concepts of systems . 
In a broad sens e ,  Easton does not conclude any specific 
reasons or propo s i tions for the nature of the behavior of 
nations with each other. He concerns himself with attempting 
to place the investigation of any international phenomenon 
within a systematic framework. An example of his observation 
of international relations is vividly portrayed in 
I l lustration I . 1 
1David Easton , "A  Systems Analysis of Political Life , "  
Modern Sys tems Research for the Behavioral Scientist , ed . by 
Walter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing C o . 1  1�68 ) , p . 43 1 .  
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Easton points out in this table that the environment 
o f  which the po l i tical system i s  a part i s  divided into two 
segments, the extra-societal system being of interest to 
this study. As this table detai l s ,  the international 
system of Easton is a very complicated structure. Structure 
is exactly what is not wanted as a final result in the 
study of Ostpolitik. This must be a study of a dynamic 
process , not of structure .  Even though Easton's table 
could also include Ostpolitik under the label of " other 
subsystems" at the bottom o f  the chart, it is not as useful 
as other systems diagrams he has produced . Easton ' s  work 
which i s  of primary importance here i s  his input-output 
theory, which is di agrammed in Illustration I I .  As i s  
evident from the diagram, Easton h a s  converted h i s  table 
of components of the environment of a pol i tical system 
into a "dynamic" flow chart. One point which must be made 
here , however, is that this diagram appears to begin with 
the combined efforts of the many diverse systems , and , 
once begun , the process i s  continued and recycled wi thout 
affecting the original components . Note the fol lowing 
diagram, I l lustration I I .  2 
2 Ibid . , p .  435.  
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This di agram serves as a good example of the inade­
quacies rel ated to Eas ton•s systems model. According to 
the flow chart the various systems within the environment 
create inputs , either in the form of demands or supports 
( representing behavior ) ,  into the political system which 
converts the inputs into outputs , being either positive , 
negative, or neutra l .  For the purposes of this study this 
process appears to be caught in procedure and structure, 
being too rigid and complex. For this reason an adaptation 
of Easton ' s  model , as diagrammed in I l lustration III , will 
serve a s the basis for the paradigm of this study ( the 
paradigm will be introduced later ) .  Illustration III i s  a 
simplification o f  the dynamic response mode l .  
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A Simplified Model of a Political System 
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As Diagram III visual i zes , the dynamic process used is one 
of inputs yielding outputs which , through a feedback in 
the environment ,  produce new inputs ; there is just as much 
influence resulting from the poli tical system on i ts own 
inf luencing inputs as from the inputs toward the pol i tical 
system. This system does not reverse or al ternate in 
direction--it is a continuous process. 
The idea of this continuous process is probably as 
old in origin as it i s  in duration. Even the Hegeli an­
di alectical process , utili zed by Karl Marx, emphasi zes a 
dynamic process of change.  Illustration IV, revealing 
similarities between the dialectic and the simplified 
input-output model , demonstrates this point.  
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The Dialectical Approach Compared to the Input-Output Approach 
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A l though the two approaches should not be compared li terally, 
as Diagram :..EL promote s ,  it does serve to show that, as 
stated earlier , the likelihood of revelations in the study 
of Ostpo l itik or international relations is very s l im ; the 
new could be traced, at least indirectly to the o l d .  
Both the theories of Morgenthau and Easton must be 
combined in order to gain the utmost u t i l i ty from the 
l iterature of Ostpo l itik for this study. The input-output 
model fa ils to place any significant degree of emphasis 
on the historical perspective--the atti tudes and behavior 
of the pas t .  This i s  the strength o f  the inclusion o f  
Morgenthau ' s  methodology, and w i l l  be dealt with i n  
CHAPTER I I I .  And yet , without the influence o f  new factors 
( influencers ) the historical approach would be incomplete. 
While Easton ' s  emphasis i s  on the actual process of trans­
forming inputs to outputs , Morgenthau ' s  emphasis has been 
placed on the causal factors--the historical perspective s .  
For the purpose o f  this study a synthes is o f  the two has 
resulted in the paradigm of this approach , Illustration V .  
The Paradigm of This Study 
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The emphasis of this study, as stressed by the shaded 
portions of I llustration v, will be to note the interrelated 
factors involved in Ostpo l i t i k ;  i t  w i l l  not be o n  the 
decis ion-making process itself .  Poli cy-making i s  a separate 
area which could take as much time as any other for a proper 
discussion; however , this i s  an area not o f .,international 
relations but of domestic studies . The two are not sepa- . 
rated ; on the contrary , as the diagram shows , they are both 
a part of Ostpo l i t i k .  Of particular importance her e ,  
however , are the qualification of the inputs and outputs 
and the external feedback. 
With a paradigm of this nature, the procedure which 
must be followed in this paper iq in the form of a subjec­
tive analysis; the bulk of the l iterature on Ostpol itik 
necessitates this approach. The analysis of the li terature 
w i l l  consequently entail a historical perspective of 
Ostpo l i tik through the post-World War II Adenauer era and 
the Grand Coalition to the SPD-FDP coalition government 
of Willy Brandt. For the purpose of expediency in this 
study the end of 1972 will serve as a cut-off date in the 
Brandt government , which w i l l  be explained later. Due to 
the bulk of primary.materials concerning the Brandt regime , 
the emphasis of this study w i l l  naturally be on the time 
of his government ,  especially in the earlier stage s .  With 
the development of post-war Ostpoli tik in its h i s torical 
- 16-
perspectives concluded , the l i terature and the included 
interrelated factors will be subjected to the paradigm, 
testing the validity and adaptability of the model . This 
model ,  in order to be workable ,  must have some objective 
to follow ;  there are many prominent questions which would 
relate to this study and which, if the model is adequate , 
should be answered. The major points involved in Ostpol itik 
are: ( 1 )  The Brandt government of the Federal Republ i c  of 
Germany contrasts greatly with the pre-SPD-FDP coalition 
governments in the outcomes and goals of i ts foreign affairs 
with Eastern Europe ; (2) The Federal Republi c  is capable 
of making a substantial and beneficial original contri­
bution to a post-Cold War detente era--will be studied and 
placed under the paradigm di agrammed in I l lustration V of 
this chapter by the procedure of the major intent of this 
paper. The major intent of this study is to investigate 
the applicability of the paradigm in the fol lowing manner: 
1 .  Determine whether the understood trends of 
Ostpolitik, as represented in the h i s torical 
primary and secondary materials , can be studied 
by the application of the paradigm of this study. 
2 .  Determine whether the use of the paradigm of a 
systems approach can make the study of Ostpolitik 
more systematic and clear . 
The major questions of this study w i l l  invariably bring to 
attention the many questions connected with the general 
sta tements of trends stated above. Thes e ,  too , are important 
when applying the methodology of the intent of this study 
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t o  Ostpolitik, and they provide a good basis for the overall 
analysis of Ostpol itik through the outlined paradigm. I t  
is widely known that there are differences between the 
Br.andt government and its predecessor s ,  but are these 
differences procedural or substantive? This is a question 
relevant to the s tudy of the propositions in their relation­
ship to the trends of Ostpolitik. A l s o ,  the extent of 
binding agreements and resolutions would appear to affect 
the outcome of any negotiations between countri es . Essential 
to the inclusion of material on Ostpo l i tik in the study 
could also be the question of independence and reliability 
of West Germany as a bargaining partner. A qualifier of 
this aspect of inputs into the model might be the extent 
to which the Federal Republic has freedom o f  direction in 
light of the balance of power situation in Europe and the 
detente between the major powers--to what extent can i t  
assert an independent role? These questions are important 
to a study of Ostpolitik. 
Through the review of the current li terature on 
Ostpolitik , the presentation of the historical perspective , 
and the analysis of the material through the paradigm , 
the study of Ostpolitik should be made more clear. The 
major intent of this study, to reiterate a previous 
statemen t ,  is to propose a sense of direction for studying 
the works of authors on Ostpolitik, whether they be 
- 18-
j ournal�stic or academic , descriptive or ana lytica l .  The 
sources covered in the insuing review of literature is by 
no means meant to be inclusive of all pertinent material 
on Ostpo l i tik ; i t  does not include sources published in 
the German language, which could be a significant addition 
to the amount of material utilized in this work. I t  does , 
however, include a number of sources translated from works 
in l anguages other than English and by authors of differing 
nationalities ; by these selections and others this study 
does provide a fair representation of sources of different 
background s .  A point should be made prior to a review o f  
the current l i terature on Ostpolitik that the intent of 
this study is not to include all material on Ostpolitik , 
but to test a representation of the body of knowledge by 
use of the paradigm of this study. Since the paradigm 
utilizes a systems approach of inputs , outputs , and 
feedback, an overview of Ostpolitik ( an historical perspec­
tive ) w i l l  be placed between the review of the l i terature 
and the analysi s .  Through the overview the developments 
and trends can be observed , and consequently , the inputs 
and outputs , whether overt or cover t ,  can be observed in 
the environment .  
Once the concepts o f  Ostpo l i tik are observed in the 
historical perspective , the Morgenthau approach, the paradig� 
adapted from Easton, will be used to dissect the information 
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contained in the l i terature and place i t  w i thin a systemic 
structure. A representative portion of the singular elements 
of West Germany ' s  foreign policy toward Eastern Europe will 
be specified and discussed. These facets , after explanatio� 
w i l l  be included in a model derived from the paradigm by 
being divided into " INPUTS" and "OUTPUT S . " The relationship 
of the one side ( " INPUTS " )  to the other side ( " OUTPUTS " )  can 
be observed as feedback through a step-by- step process. 
This stepped process w i l l  be separated by different govern­
mental periods in the post-World War I I  Federal Republi c .  
In many instances one step's outputs , noting the feedback 
proces s ,  w i l l  result in later inputs , just as inputs yield 
output s.  Through this process the intent o f  thi s  study 
w i l l  be implemented. 
CHAPTER I I  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before developing an overview of Ostpolitik or an 
analysis of the literature on the subj ect , it is first 
necessary to observe and point out the current available 
material. There is a great deal of information concerning 
West Germany's foreign policies toward her neighbors . The 
purpose of this discussion is not to include as many sources 
as possible ,  but rather to reveal a representation of the 
current available material in light of the intent of this 
study. As previously noted , the literature revi ewed in 
this segment and used throughout this paper does not include 
German language publications , unless they have been trans­
lated into English. This omission cou ld be a limiting 
f actor but not necessarily a hindrance to a successful 
analysis . 
As previously stated in the introduction to this 
study, the procedura l  differences in the study of Ostpoli tik 
are many, just as is the case with any area in the field 
of international relations. This does not conclude , however , 
that there are only differences in the method by which the 
topic i s  discussed . Indeed, upon examination of the material 
of various authors , the substantive contributions of some 
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must be recognized . These contributions lie in different 
areas which have been determined in this study for the 
purpose of c omparing one to the other. Although most 
catagories considered in this chapter deal w i th the substance 
of information , there is one article which is noteworthy 
because of its relevance to the systems approach of 
methodo logy. 
A. Systemic Approach . --Elmer P l i schk e ,  in his article 
"West German Foreign and Defense P o l i cy11 3 a ttempts to place 
West German foreign and defense policies into a systematic 
structure . He succeeds in placing individual governmental 
policies under group headings ( Table I ,  pp. 1 10 4- 1 105 ), and 
then through a process of making a structural table 
' 
functional he projects selected policy options for West 
German security ( Table IV, pp. 1 1 2 8-11 29 ) .  Through this 
last i l lustration Plischke reveals the policy options from 
the primary stage through the related suboptions . He 
attempts to place in perspective the various paths the 
Federal Republic might follow in its efforts to achieve 
its goals .. Some of the policy options potenti a l ly ava i l able 
in P l i schke'� tables might be incompatible with the policies 
which he conceives West Germany to have. He does , however , 
make an attempt to place them within a system of potenti als 
3Elmer Pli schke, "West German Foreign and Defense 
Po l i cy , "  Orbi s ,  XII ( Winter , 1969 ) , pp. 1098-1 1 2 9 .  
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and possibi lities. In this respect he is alone in his 
.s.ys.temic table approach to the study o f  Ostpoli tik. 
B .  An Historical Approach . --Whi le Plischke uti l i zes 
a systems approach, _other authors correspond to the method-
ology of Morgenthau. This section is devoted to a repre-
sentative portion of those using this approach to Ostpolitik, 
the historical approach . Willerd R.  Fann notes that West 
Germany's "offer to ignore the Hallstein Doctrine in East 
Europe and friendly gestures to East Germany represented 
a signi f icant departure in West German foreign policy ; 1 1 4 
he then proceeds to explain the historical background of 
this change. In " Ostpo li tik in Historical Perspective11 5 
F e l i x  E .  Hirsch compares and contrasts the Brandt policies 
and ideas of detente to those of the Stresemann•s inter-war 
government .  I n  h i s  study of Stresemann and Brandt, Hirsch 
reveals that both wanted to improve their country ' s  inter-
national standing by ties with Western powers, and that 
good rel ations with Soviet Russia were not incompatible 
with this goa l .  Hans Kohn also made it clear in "Germany 
in World Politics11 6 that the historical development of 
4 . Willerd R. Fann, "Germany and East Europe : Problems 
of :.Det:ente�" Current History, LIV (May , 1968 ) ,  p. 263. 
5Felix E .  Hirsch, "Ostpo l i tik in Historical 
Perspective , "  Current History, LXII (May, 1972),  pp. 229- 2 2 3 .  
6Hans Kohn , "Germany in World Poli tics, " 
Current History, XLIV (April , 196 3), p. 202. 
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post-war West Germany was not to be taken lightly by foreign 
countries . In accordance with H i rsch , Kohn tied the Brandt 
government to the historical picture of Germany. 
c. The Question of Independence. --An additional 
substantive area of concern which is an important part of 
the study of Ostpo l i tik is the question o f  independence 
in the action o f  the Federal Republi c  and i ts degree of 
original coutribution to detente. A number of authors 
concern themselves primarily with this topic and make 
substantial contributions as wel l .  E . H .  Albert ,  writing 
in International Affair s ,  states that the Brandt doctrine 
could be more of a change in style than in substance when 
7 comparing i t  to the past government s .  He continues by 
stating quite vividly that there are only two developments 
which might lead to German unity in a real sense: 
( a )  A disintegration of the Western defense system 
which would enable the Soviet Union to impose a 
German settlement on Communi s t  terms. The most 
likely cause would be United States disengagement 
from Europe- - the current nightmare of a l l  Western 
European governments and the unchanging long-term 
objective of Soviet policy. 
( b )  A collapse of Soviet control over the East European 
countri e s ,  including the G . D . R. The so-called 
policy of strength-- associated·with the names of 
Adenauer and Dulles--which dreamed of ' ro l ling back 
the iron curtain , '  f a i led to achieve this and soon 
became discredited. The 1 9 5 3  East German rising, 
the 1956 Hungar ian revolution and the 1968 liber­
ation movement in Cz echoslovakia presented serious 
7 E . H .  Albert , "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in 
Germany, 1  International Aff�irs , XLVI (Apr i l ,  1970 ),pp�,29� 303. 
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threats to Russian control, but the West were unable 
to do anything in their support and by using military 
force the Soviet leaders were able to demonstrate 
their determinat�on and ability to maintain thejr 
power structure. 
These two conditions appear to be the only ways in which 
the one German nation can be achieved, according to Albert. 
He continues by stating as a central theme that the Federal 
Republic is free to operate within a limited set of 
boundaries. 
Along the same lines James H. Wolfe, in "West Germany 
and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation," 
stated that one major reason for a failure of Adenauer's 
foreign policy, and likely limit on Brandt's as well, is 
that the great powers found the status quo a reasonable, 
if presumably only temporary, solution to the German 
question.9 In this same article Wolfe continually links 
the stalemate of the German problem to the major powers. 
Wolfe and Albert are accompanied in their estimations 
10 by Christoph Bertram, and refuted to varying degrees by 
others, most notably by Adam Bromke and Harald von Riekhoff 
8 . Ibid., pp. 297-298. 
9 James H. Wolfe, "West Germany and Czechoslovakia: 
The Struggle for Reconciliation," Orbis, XIV (Spring, 1970), 
p. 171. 
lOChristoph Bertram, "West German Perspectives on 
European Security: Continuity and Change," The World Today, 
XXVII (March, 1971), pp. 115-123. 
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on the one hand 11 . and Norman A .  Graebner on the other. 1 2  
Bertram points out that West Germany ' s  Ostpo l i t i k ,  in his 
estimation, has not accomplished any fundamental change 
from the past policies of German governments and, more 
i�portantly, that any improvements brought about by West 
German efforts are indissolubly linked to the East-West 
relations of the major powers--namely , the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Bromke and Riekhoff conversely stress 
that West Germany, in offering the Poles an even more 
explicit acceptance of the territorial status guo of the 
Poli sh-German border , exercised a great degree of inde-
pendence and al lowed the Polish government an independent 
stance as wel l .  This i s  a rather general type o f  comment 
on their part s ;  even more specific i s  Norman Graebner when 
he notes that " i t  was the defeated power o f  World War I I ,  
not the Western victor s ,  that first recogµ i zed the terri-
torial and po litical changes wrought by that war . The 
United States accepted Ostpolitik,  albeit without 
enthus iasm . 111 3  He clari f i ed this even further when he 
emphasized that when West German Foreign Minister 
11 . Adam Bromke and Harald von Riekhoff , "The West 
German- Polish Treaty , "  · The World Today ,  XXVI I ( March, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  
pp. 1 2 4- 1 3 1 .  
1 2  Norman A .  Graebner , "Germany Between East and Wes t , "  
Current History, LXII (May , 1 9 7 2 ) ,  pp . 2 2 5 - 2 2 8 .  
1 3 Ibid. , p .  2 2 5 . 
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Walter Scheel visited Washington in July, 1970, the U.S. 
administration "refused to endorse the specifics of Brandt's 
-Ostpolitik, and merely welcomed West Germany's efforts to 
'normalize relations with the East•.11
14 
D. Insights Into Change. --Another major catagorical 
division in the current literature on Ostpolitik should 
logically fall under the area of insights into the causes 
of change in West German foreign policy. Prominent in this 
area is Josef Korbel who, in two sequential articles 
appearing in Orbis, made two major points. In the first 
article he divided the relations between the two German 
states into eight major stages ranging from Adenauer's 
policy resulting in estrangement of t he two German states 
to Brandt's de facto recognition of the German Democratic 
Republic. 15 The most important part of this first article 
was the printed results of public opinion polls taken from 
1947 to 1966 on various questions. In publishing a poll 
taken by Die Zeit on March 28, 1967, Korbel noted that: 
In 1956 the partition of Germany was considered 
"intolerable" by 52 per cent; in 1962 by 61 per cent; 
and in 1963 by 53 per cent. Then, a sudden drop 
occurred: in 1965 the proportion finding it intolerable 
declined to 38 per cent, and in 1966 to 26 per cent. 16 
14 Ibid., p. 228. 
15 Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: I, Intra-
German Relations," Orbis, XIII (Winter, 1970), pp. 1050-1068. 
16 Ibid. , p. 1062. 
-27-
Korbel utilizes the survey information to indicate, though 
not conclusively, that West Germans have become increas-
ingly aware of the division of their country. In his second 
article he sets up stages of development again, though this 
time for the Eastern European countries as a whole, and 
states: 
A sense of reality has been injected into this promising 
phase in the diplomatic tug of war between West Germany 
and Eastern Europe. On the one side, Moscow and its 
allies seem ready, for their own compelling political 
and economic reasons, to engage in serious negotiations 
with Bonn; on the other side, �Brandt's obvious 
sincerity in seeking a reconciliation with the East 
must impress even the profoundly suspicious minds of 
the Soviet leaders if they really want a general detente 
in Europe. 17 
This is Korbel's conceptualization of the detente possi-
bilities in Europe in 1970; he provided further insight 
into a possible relating factor in an earlier article, 
"German-Soviet Relations: The Past and Prospects. " 
Included .in this article is a lengthy but definitely 
beneficial phrase which warrents inclusion here. 
The fact that Germany and Russia fought each 
other i9 two bloody wars should not blind us to another 
historical fact: the long-lasting cooperation and 
mutual dependence of the two countries that stretched 
over a period of 150 years before World War I, 
re-emerged between the two big wars, and was evident 
again from 1939 to 1941, in spite of radical changes 
in the regimes--from Czarism to Bolshevism in Russia 
and from Hohenzollern authoritarian rule, to the 
·Weimar democracy, to totalitarian Naziism in Germany. 
17Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A 
Policy Toward the Soviet Allies," Orbis, XIV (Summer, 1970), 
p. 326. 
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The founder of this traditional cooperation , Frederick 
the Great , advised his successors to •cultivate the 
friendship of these {Rus s i a n )  barbarians ; '  the corner­
stone of Bismarck ' s  foreign policy was to 'keep the 
wire to S t .  Petersburg open; ' Stresemann never missed 
the opportunity to cultivate ' the spirit of Rapallo ; '  
and Hitler spoke frequently {admittedly for only a 
short period gf time ) of Germany ' s  common interests 
with Rus s i a . l 
Wolfram F .  Hanrieder , in an article appearing in 
Orbi s ,  centers his observations on the theme that the key 
1 9  t o  European coexistence lies i n  Moscow, because Eastern 
Europe CQlUld conceivably be frozen to Bonn by Moscow. This 
not only appears to be true, according to much of the 
information available, but i t  also relates to the high 
percentage of Germans in the Federal Republic who are 
interested in ,  and aware o f ,  foreign affairs. From a series 
of table s ,  i n  a quantitative articl�, Peter H.  Merkl 
i l lustrates changing attitudes of the Germans and , accompany-
ing his data, he notes that 11 2 7 . 1% of West Germans {are ) 
very interested in international affair s ,  as compared to 
16 . 9% Engli shmen, 1 1 . 9% Frenchmen , 8 . 7% Japanes e ,  and 4 . 4% 
I t a l i ans . " .20 Again, drawing parallels and relationships , 
18Josef Korbel ,  "German- Soviet Relation s :  The Past 
and Prospects , "  Orbi s ,  X {Winter , 1966} , p .  1047 . 
19wolfram F .  Hanrieder , "West German Foreign Policy :  
Background to Current Issues , "  Orbi s ,  XIII {Winter , 1 9 70 ) , 
p .  1030 . 
20Peter H.  Merk l ,  "Poli tico-Cultural Restraints on 
West German Foreign Policy: Sense of Trust, Identity, and 
Agency , "  Comparative Poli tical Studies , III {January, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  
p .  445 . 
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the high percentage of West Germans being interested in 
international affairs might well explain the popu larity of 
the S . P . D .  in the 1969 election. Lewis J .  Edinger and 
Paul Luebk e,  J r .  make an interesti�g note of this in their 
work in Comparative Politic s , 2 1  studying opinions of 
c i t izens on various issues in one district in the State of 
North Rhine-Westphalia as they respond to questions-of 
security, reunification and governmental responsivenes s .  
As noted by the four s�bheading s ,  the approach t o  
the study of Ostpolitik is varied. Three of the four , 
h i s torical, independence , and insigh t ,  are substantively 
descriptive and add clarity to the subject in descriptive 
explanations. The other, a systemic outline , deals with 
a " method" of studying West German foreign policy . In this 
respect the work of Plischke in the first section directly 
relates to the methodology of this study-- that of model-
building and organization of the material into a structur�. 
Substantively , Plis chke has little to o f fer when compared 
to the authors mentioned in the remaining three sections. 
Within the histori cal approa.ch all three authors ,  u t i l i zing 
a similar de�criptive method , concur on the links of West 
German foreign policy of today w i th the past development s .  
2 1Lewis J .  Edinger and Paul Luebke,  Jr . ,  "Grass-Roots 
Electoral Politics in the German Federal Republic: Five 
Constituencies in the 1969 Election , "  Comparative Politics , 
I I I  (July , 197 1 ) ,  p .  4 7 3 .  
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The section concerning the independent stature of West 
Germany provides the most significant contradiction of any 
group of the l i terature .  While Alber t ,  Wolfe , and Bertram 
agree that the Brandt-Scheel government represented no 
fundamental change f�om the past, Bromke , Riekhof f ,  and 
Graebner point out that the West German-Polish treaty 
clearly i l lustrated the independence of the West German 
government.  In providing insight into the causes of chang e ,  
the last group of authors represent a pattern i n  the 
development of West Germany ' s  post-World War I I  Ostpoli tik 
from es trangement to coexistence and de facto recognition 
of the European s i tuation. 
Upon observation of the preceeding li terature and 
a subsequent discussion i t  i s  evident that even though 
Ostpolitik i s  well- covered by the existing material , i t  
i s  often studied under dif ferent and sometimes opposing 
methods .  Even when the same general concepts are used, as 
in the case of independence , the conclusions of the authors 
may vary greatly. With such a variety of approaches to the 
study of Ostpo l itik being used, the subject i s  likely to 
become clouded and unclear. There needs to be a sense of 
direction in methodoiogy in order to reap the g�eatest 
u t i l i ty from the study of Ostpo l i tik . 
<:HAPTER I I I  
A SUMMATION OF OSTPOLITIK: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The purpose of a summation of Ostpolitik is merely 
to provide an overview of the development of West Germany's 
foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. This is not meant 
to provide revelations in the study of the subject, but to 
place the major events of post-World War I I  Ostpolitik 
in their proper perspective. Noting the paradigm in the 
first chapter which will be studied later, the importance 
of the original sources of methodology ip relevant here. 
The paradigm of this study is an adaptation of primarily 
the work of David Easton. Also important to this study, 
however, is Hans J. Morgenthau, who stresses the necessity 
of viewing international relations from an historical 
standpoint. Following Morgenthau•s guidelines, a historical 
summation will serve as a foundation for a subsequent 
Easton-related systemic analysis of the phases of Ostpolitik. 
Ostpolitik is nothing new in Germany's history; 
Frederick the Great was concerned with the promotion of 
ties with Czarist Russia; Otto von Bismarck, often pro­
claimed as Germany's greatest statesman, was very adament 
about Ostpolitik, as witnessed by his constant efforts of 
appeasement in Eastern Europe, i.e. the Reinsurance Treaty 
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and settlements of disputes in the Balkans. E ven Adolf 
Hitler for a brief time was concerned with a friendly 
Russian ally from 1939 to 1 941. Therefore, when Konrad 
Adenauer propo sed and implemented his postwar doctrines 
toward East Germany and the communist states of Eastern 
Europe he was not only trying to force the Soviet Union 
into submission, but he w a s  also emb arking on a new era 
of German foreign affairs with the East. As e arly as 
1 963 scholars were forecasting a ch ange from the current 
1 .  f W G f . 1 . 22 Th th ine o est erman oreign re ations. e pressure en 
increased to relax restraints on relations with E astern 
Europe. A s  the years went on the H allstein Doctrine was 
gradually ignored and finally, under Chancellor Kurt George 
Kiesinger and the Grand Coalition, dropped. 23 This was the 
first step in a change in O stpolitik of the CDU. 
After the co alition government of the Social Democratic 
P arty and the Free Democratic P arty g ained power under the 
direction of Chancellor Willy Bran dt and Foreign Minister 
W alter Scheel, the role of West German foreign policy seemed 
to h ave gained new prominence in Europe , and, consequently, 
the world. Chancellor Brandt has, during his term, promoted 
the achievement of bold new steps in a detente in Europe as 
22Kohn, " Germany in World Politic s," p. 202. 
23 F ann, "Germany and East Europe," p. 263. 
H anrieder, "West German Foreign Policy, 11 p. 10 31. 
Korbel, "West Germany ' s  O stpolitik : I , "  p. 1058. 
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well as a decline of the Cold War of the f i fties and sixties. 
Since accessing the SPD-FDP coalition parties of the 
Bundestag in 196 9 ,  the eyes o f  the world have been focused 
on the chancellor ' s  program of Ostoo l i t i k ,  and especially 
on former Chancellor Willy Brand t .  
With this i n  mind , the ensuing pages w i l l  try to 
emcompass a review of past developments of West German 
Ostpolitik! Ostpolitik ,  like any other international 
phenomenon , cannot be studied in a vacuum ; merely commencing 
with the SPD-FDP Bundestag victory in 1969 would not reveal 
a true picture of this phase of West German foreign 
relations . The development of "Willy Brand t ' s  Ostpo l i tik" 
began not in 1969 but in the early days of the Grand 
Coalition government of the CDU/CSU-SPD in 1966 . This was 
the beginning of SPD governmental influence in foreign 
affairs which W il ly Brandt held from 1966 to 1969 as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs . Therefore, 1966 w i l l  serve 
as a logical starting point of the initiation of a bold 
new Ostpolitik .  
But ,  i s  this new Grand Coalition Ostpolitik a radical 
diversion from the past? The CDU/CSU had easily controlled 
the government from· 1949 to 1 9 6 3  ,1 at whis:h time Konrad 
Adenauer ' s  policies toward Eastern Europe were partially 
defeated. The Hallstein Doctrine lacked utility and oppo­
sition grew toward the Chancellor himself. Indeed, a true 
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challenge was emerging both domes tically and externally.  
The SPD , which was consistently more progressive in foreign 
affairs than the CDU/CSU, was becoming more vocal , and the 
FDP was even strong enough to have a voice in government .  
Had i t  not been for the cooperation of the FDP i n  1966 the 
CDU/CSU might not have controlled the Bundestag. These 
events indicated a trend back toward the traditional ties 
with the East and the lessoning of tensions with those 
countries- - a  development which could ultimately benef i t  the 
Federal Republi c .  
A picture o f  the histori�al setting o f  Ostpolitik in 
postwar German po l i tics appears in recent literature on 
the subj ect. Josef Korbel related the historical signif i-
cance o f  Ostpo li tik ' s  development .  He finds Adenauer ' s  
1 .  h t E t E . f f  . 2 4  d po icy approac es o as ern urope ine ective , an 
further shows the change in the CDU/CSU- SPD coalition 
government in its acknowledgement of the importance of the 
. 25 Soviet Union �n a detente in Europe. (Although it should 
be noted that Adenauer established diplomatic relations 
w i th the U . S . S . R . in 19 5 5 ,  theoretically breaking the 
Hallstein Doctrine ) .  
24Korbe l ,  
25 Ib ' d  }. 
• I 
"West Germany ' s  Ostpolitik:  
p .  1 0 5 3 .  
I , "  p .  1 0 5 1 .  
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I n  dealing w i th the Warsaw Treaty Organ i zation members Bonn 
1 . d . f . . . h M 26 rea ize it must irst negotiate w i t  oscow. This under-
standing became even more evident after the Czech crisis o f  
2 7  August , 1 9 6 8 .  A t  this point i n  time the Soviet Union, 
w i th the help and insis tance of the German Democratic 
Republ ic , forced a centrali zation and cohesion within the 
W . T . O . members ' foreign pblicie s ,  even those of the more 
dissident members. 28 The Ostpo l i tik of the Federal Republic 
was severely hindered by these developments , but i t  must 
also be understood that the U . S . S . R .  was placed in a position 
which was precarious in its own right. The use of force to 
quell any deviation from the Soviet line could not be 
repeatedly utilized.  Soviet intervention delayed negoti-
ations with Czechoslovak i a  but soon afterward relations with 
29 Poland began to open up . And, the promotion of German-
Rumanian relations continued on a low sca l e . 30 
26Hanrieder , "West German Foreign Policy , "  p .  1029 . 
Ibid . , p .  1030 . 
Korbel , "West Germany ' s  Ostpoli tik : I , " p .  10 5 3 .  
" Soviet Body Urges Bonn to Ratify Pact , "  The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Pres s ,  XXIV ( May � lO ,  1 9 7 2 ) ,  p .  1 .  
27Korbe], , "West Germany ' s  Ostpolitik:  I I , " p.  3 3 6 .  
Wolfe , "West Germany and Czechoslovaki a , "  p .  1 5 4 .  
2 8  Alber t ,  "The Brandt Doctrine , "  p .  2 9 5 .  
29 
30 
Korbel , "West Germany ' s  Ostpolitik: I , "  p. 10 5 5 .  
Korbel ,  "West Germany ' s  Ostpoli tik:  I I , "  p.  3 3 6 .  
Theo Sommer , "Bonn ' s  New Ostpolitik , "  Journal of 
International Affai rs , XXII ( 1 96 8 ) , p .  6 5 .  
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The Federal Republic of Germany has of ten been c on­
s idered the crossroads be tween East and West in the European 
area. This has been the assump tion of the Brandt government, 
s ince 196 9 ,  in i ts c onduc t of affairs w i th other s ta tes. 
This is why the Brandt-Scheel government in Bonn has been 
so bold and de termined in the way in which i t  has under­
taken the reshap ing of West Germany's foreign relations. 
The government ' s  s o-called Eastern pol i t ics 1 greeted w i th 
en thusiasm in some quarters and b i t terly opposed in others, 
is nothing less than an elaborate attempt to reach a deten te 
w i th all of Eastern Europe, including the German Democratic 
Republic. The treaty w i th Moscow mu tually renounc ing the 
use of force, the treaty w i th Warsaw settling the crucial 
German-Polish border problem, and Chancellor Brand t's two 
summ i t  meetings w i th the head of the East German government, 
Willi Stoph, in 1 9 7 0 ,  a t  Erfurt and Kassel, are all inter­
rela ted l inks in Bonn ' s  attempt a t  d e tente in Europe. These 
attempts to come to terms w i th the W.T. O. members pre­
supposes, as d iscussed prev iously, a rejec tion of the 
fundamental tenets of Bonn's former foreign policy. In 
turn, this renunc iation was denounced by the CDU/CSU a t  
the time as beiqg totally unacceptable and as being total 
capi tulation to the Russians, even· though K iesinger began 
the present trend of Ostp olitik in the Grand Coal ition, 
1966- 1969 . The Brandt-Scheel c oal i t i on government has, in 
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addition to relations with the U.S.S.R., tried to extend 
eff orts at normali iation of relations with Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Here the 
degree of success the Federal Republic has achieved has 
v aried c onsiderably from one country to another. Overall, 
however, a better atmosphere has been cre ated, and a notice-
able enthusiasm for further action has developed in Bonn. 
F our preliminary remarks must be made about the 
Ostpolitik, the E astern policy of the F.R.G. government : 
1. It is not the result of a radical break with the 
past but rather a logical outcome of an evolution that 
st arted in the mid-sixties under Foreign Minister Gerhard 
Schroder ; i � was first expressed ip the Peace Note of 
March 1966, and was assiduously developed by the Grand 
C 1 .  . 31 oa ition. 
2 .  It is firmly embedded in the f abric of a strong 
Western alliance. In fact, it is in n o  way an attempt to 
break away from the alliance, but rather an attempt to 
engage the political strength of the alliance in order to 
overcome the sterile confrontation of the past decade. 
West Germany will not become a "wanderer between the two 
31Eleanor Lansing Dulles, One Germany or Two? 
(New York: Harper and R ow, 1968), p .  113. 
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worlds , "  as Chancellor Wi lly Brandt has repeatedly stated. 
It is no " floating kidney . 11 3 2  
3 .  Bonn ' s  Eastern probe fits into the wide pattern 
of Western policy vis-a-vis the communi s t  states . I ts 
basic aim i s  to find out what room and readiness there are 
in the East for compromise and conciliation. Like other 
Western probes-- such as the ( SALT ) talks--theirs is also 
governed by the basic consideration that if it fails they 
must not find themselves in a worse position than before. 
They shall not embark on any adventure from which their 
allies will have to bail them out ;  this would be po litically 
disasterous also. 
4 .  The evolution o f  a more sovereign and more eco-
nomically powerful European Economic Community also could 
be related to facilitating negotiations. 
In any negotiations w i th Eastern Europe, as stated 
above, the Soviet Union must play an initial role. There-
for e ,  through a long proces s ,  Federal Chancellor Brandt 
undertook the task of bargaining w i th Soviet offici a l s .  
In h i s  State of the Union message of January 14 , 1970 , he 
commented, "The principal aim of our policy i s  to make the 
3 2Report on the State of the Nation, 1970 ( Bonn: 
Press and Information Office of the Federal Government , 
1 9 7 0 ) ,  p. 1 4.  
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renunci ation of force the basis for improving· our relations 
w i th all Eastern European states . "  He ruled out any other 
possibi li ties ; . " th e  renunciation o f  force • . .  the 
only way open to the German people i s  that of a policy of 
peace11 3 3  . o f  any other type o f  bargaining position with 
any Eastern European state and, consequently , negotiations 
with the Soviet Union were reported to have begun seriously 
by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel on February 2 7 ,  197 0 . 34 
But ,  preliminary discussipn s ,  as i s  diplomatically customary , 
were long and tedious. On June 7 ,  the Federal Cabinet 
issued its set of guidelines for the German- Soviet negoti-
ations. These consisted o f :  ( 1 )  A strict renunciation o f  
force to settle disputes between the FRG and the U . S . S . R. ; 
( 2 )  The maintenance of the free status o f  West Berlin ; 
( 3 )  The validity of existing treaties and agreemen ts; 
( 4 )  German se lf-determiniation; ( 5 )  The movement toward a 
united and peaceful Europe; and, ( 6 )  The support of the 
1 . . f h w 
. 
3 5  po 1c1es o t e estern nations . 
Therefore, after the negotiations were set up an d 
f�nally begun on July 2 7 ,  and after eleven days of direct 
negotiation between the FRG and U . S . S . R. , the German- Soviet 
3 3willy Brand t ,  A Peace Polic·y for Europe ( New York : 
Hol t ,  Rinehart and Winston, 1969) , p .  2 9 .  
3 4  Report, 1970 , p .  1 5 .  
3 5 Ib ' d  15 
_
_
 1_ . , p. . 
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treaty was initialed by the two Foreign Mini�ter s ,  Scheel 
and Gromyko respectively, with Scheel commenting in his 
reply " that nations with different social systems can still 
36 work together . "  And after the cabinet meeting in Bonn 
the Federal Chancellor accepted an invitation to go to 
Moscow and sign the treaty on August 1 2 ,  1970 , an historic 
occasion for the people of Germany and the Soviet Union. 
The details of the various articles of the August 1 2  
Moscow Treaty are a s  stated : 
1 .  The treaty opens the way to an improvement in 
relations between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the U . S . S . R. 
2 .  In German terms the renunciation by both sides of 
the use o f  force implies that the Soviet Union 
denounces every claim o f  intervention against 
the FRG. 
3 .  The Moscow agreements give reason to hope that 
economi c ,  scienti f i c ,  technological , and cultural 
cooperation between the two can be strengthened. 
4 .  The treaty specifically stresses the validity of 
existing treaties between each party and i ts 
allies . 
5 .  The right and respons ibilities o f  the Four Powers 
for Germany as a whole and for Berlin are not 
affected by the treaty. 
6 .  The national goal of German unity through self­
de�ermination remains. 
7 .  The agreed inviolability of existing frontiers 
does not curtail the sovereign right of every 
state . to cede to change frontiers by peaceful 
agree�ent .  
36 The Treaty of August 12, ,1970 ( Bonn : Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Governmen t ,  1070 ) ,  
pp. 139- 140 . 
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8 .  The treaty will aid Four Powers negotiations in 
improving the Berlin s i tuation. 37 
This agreement was closely fol lowed by the treaty between 
the Federal Republ ic of Germany and the Peopl e ' s  Republ ic 
of Poland , signed on November 18, 1970 . Its provisions 
were much more explicit than the Moscow Treaty, though i t  
s a i d  basically the same thing. 3 8 . A very prominent provision 
of the German- Polish treaty was the recognition of the 
Oder-Neisse line as the western border of Poland. 39 
Fol lowing these treati e s ,  there was a basic and 
historic occasion on September 3 ,  1 9 7 1 :  the date o f  the 
signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin . The 
primary points of this agreement between the U . S . S . R . , 
France , and the United Kingdom may be divided into three 
major areas : ( 1 )  Each party recognized the existing 
arrangement among them and agreed not to use force to change 
in regards to Ber l i n ;  ( 2 )  Provisions of transit traf fic 
between W est Berlin and the Federal Republic were guaranteed 
by the U . S . S . R. , with the othe r three guaranteeing the 
independent governing status of ·West Berlin ( detailed 
arrangements of traff i� were to be worked out by the two 
German governments ) ,  and traffic and visitation of West 
3 7Ibid .  I p .  160 . 
3 8Ibid . , pp. 7- 9 .  
39Bromke and Riekhof f ,  "The West German-Polish Treaty , "  
p .  1 25 .  
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Berliners to East German terri tory would be improved; 
(3) The agreement would be effective when the prov isions 
and measures set forth in (2) were achieved . Karl Ka i ser 
eloquently described the prospec ts of a detente in Europe 
af ter the Berlin Agreement: 
First, i t  now appears that the West German Govern­
ment's approach of concluding the treaty w i th Mo scow 
prior to a Four Power Agreement and of linking the two 
together was successful. Second, among the gains which 
the Berlin Agreement contains for We s t  Berlin and West 
Germany, one of the most important is almost entirely 
overlooked. A t  a time when the Europeans are concerned 
about U . S. w i thdrawal and a poss ible wea�ening of the 
American commitment on which European security depends, 
i t  is par ticularly important tha t this Agreement ties 
the Un i ted States in firm and intricate ways to the 
securi ty of West Berlin and, thereby, to West Germany 
and Europe . In this sense the Berlin Agreement equals 
in impor tance the Trea ties of Germany of 195 4-1955. 40 
The impor tance of the Quadripar tite Agreement on Berlin was 
also described well by Lawrence L. Whetten when he sta ted 
the net losses for Ea s t  Germany. W i th both the Soviets and 
Western allies making conce ssions, the GDR lost: (1) Its 
claim of West Berlin being on its (Ea s t  German) terri tory; 
(2) Its claim of the right to regulate tran s i t  traffic to 
West Berlin; (3) The argument of the total independence of 
West Berlin from the FRG; (4) A Four Power confirmation of 
41 the constitu tional linkage of Ea s t  Berlin to East Germany. 
40The Trea t be tween the Federal Re ublic of German 
and the People's Republic of Poland Bonn: Press and 
Informa tion Office of the Federal Government, 1970), p. 8 .  
41Karl Kaiser, "Prospects for West Germany after the 
Berlin Agreemen t , "  The World Today, XXVI II (January, 19 7 2 ) , 
pp. 3 1-32. 
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The area of · Ostpo l itik dealing with the German 
Democratic Republic is a much different line of discussion. 
From comments made up to this point it is clear that a 
detente between these governments would be a much larger 
and more difficult proces s .  However , this does not mean 
the two sides woul d ,  forever , view each other as they did 
in the fifties and early sixties ; this is evidenced by the 
consultations and negotiations at Erfurt and Kassel on 
March 19  and May 2 1 ,  1970 , respectively . To sum up the 
situation at Erfur t ,  Wolfram Dorn, Parliamentary State 
Secretary and member of the Federal Republi c ' s  delegation 
to Erfur t ,  stated on March 2 3 ,  that "nobody who was seri-
ously acquainted with the pol i tical s i tuation had expected 
concrete results . 11 4 2  He conc luded in a rather humorous 
note by saying, "The spirit of Erfurt . insofar as one 
may use this figure of speech . . .  was not the spirit o f  
uni ty . But i t  was a beginning on the way of mutual dis-
. ,, 43  cuss ion . 
This was a very accurate description of the a tmosphere 
at Erfurt 
• 
.Most · of the progress made was that each side 
proposed i ts view of the bas i c  problems facing the two 
states . Chairman Wil�y S toph of the Ministerial Council of 
42 Lawrence L.  Whetten, "Appraising the Ostpoli tik , 11 
Orbis ,  XV ( F a l l , 1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp. 8 7 7- 8 7 8 .  
4 3  Erfurt; March 19, 1970 ( Bonn: Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Governmen t ,  1970 ) ,1 p. 9 4 .  
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the German Democratic Republic summarized in seven p oints 
what he saw as the goal of the negotiations . His p oints 
included the establishment of equal-status relations on 
the basis of internati onal law ; giving up of the claim to 
sole representation of the German people by the Federal 
Republic ; non-intervention in the foreign affairs of other 
states ; renunciation of f orce ; unlimited recognition 
acc ording to international law ; territorial integrity and 
the inviolability of existing state borders ; application 
by . b oth states for U . N .  membership ; renunci�tion of nuclear 
weapons and renunciation of p roduction, use or storage of 
B and C weapons ; reduction of armanent expenditures by 
fifty per cent ; discussion of all questions involving the 
results of the Second World War;· settlement of all the 
Federal G overnment's debts and regulation of obligations 
44 to make restitution payments. 
On the othe r hand, Chancellor Brandt had concluded 
that the basic element of West Germany's positipn was that 
in the interest of peace " one c ould arrive via a regulated 
beside-one-another as a with-one-another11 4 5 status. This, 
Herr Brandt, .continued, depended on the certain condi:tions 
which serve as premises t o  such achievements, which could 
be summarized in four points: 
44 Tb ' d  - 1 • ' p. 94. 
4 5 Ib ' d  1 • I pp. 84-85. 
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Firs t :  The constitutions of both states in Germany are 
oriented toward the unity of the nati on ,  and both fore­
see that partition is no permanent solution. 
Second: Both states have treaties with , in each case,  
a part o f  the signatories of the Four Power accord on 
Germany, and both treaties have clauses that consider 
Germany as a whol e.  
Third : A s for the family ties and the common pas t ,  
these facts are s o  obvious that they need not even be 
talked about .  
Fourth: As does the Federal Government , the GDR too-­
judging from publi c  speeches and declarations--sees the 
other side as something other than could be dealt w i th 
as foreign. 46 
The conference held at Kassel had been scheduled after Erfurt 
to serve more or less as a continuation of the previous 
meeting. The results of the meeting , however , produced no 
concrete results either. The same general· attitudes· of both 
S toph and Brandt were displayed after Kassel as after Erfurt. 
Chairman Stoph, in a television interview upon his return 
from Kasse l ,  made the comment th a t :  
• 
• • the differences i n  opinions have not been 
narrowed since Erfurt by the Brandt Government .  Contrary 
to certain promises and remarks made by Herr Brandt in 
Erfurt , the Federal Government has continued through 
certain measures to �iscriminate against the German 
Democratic Republic. A? 
While on the other s ide o f  the conference table , Chancellor 
Brandt concluded th�t ,  "Facing the cold facts, the public 
in the West and East w i l l  be able to distinguish between 
46 Ibid . , p .  6 1 .  
47Kassel; May 21, 1970 ( Bonn : Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Governemt, 1970 ) ,  p. 7 1 .  
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w h o  is endeavoring to pursue a rigid policy for Eur opean 
peace and �ho i s  flexible. 1 48 He was, naturally, re ferring 
to the r igidity of the GDR. 
Further developments in Intra-German relations 
yielded the "Agreement to Facilitate Travel From and to 
Berlin" which was signed on December 1 7  '· 1971 , a s  according 
to the provisions of the Berlin Ag�eement, the implementing 
49 measure of the F our Power accord. But, of primary im por-
tance in negotiations between the two German states was the 
"Basic Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic, 11 50 initialled on November 8, 
1972, and signed on December 21, 1972. This treaty on the 
basis of relations between the two parties is a lengthy 
and important step in the detente of Europe. This agreement 
does fall short of official recognition of the GDR by the 
FRG, but the reasons far this are e xplained as early as 
January 1970, by the SPD deputy leader Herbert Wehner. 51 
This objective of West Germany, along with a brief summary 
of West German foreign and defense policy was outlined by 
48 Ibi· d. ,. 7 5 76 pp. - • 
49 " Intra-German Agreements Implement Four Power Acc ord, " 
The Bulletin, XIX ( December 20, 1971), pp. 345-349. 
50 11Basic Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic is Initialled, " The 
Bulletin, XX (N ovember 14, 1972), pp. 293-304. 
�-
51 Whetten, "Appraising the O stpolitik , 1 1 pp. 876-877. 
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Elmer Pli schke in 1969 as to those points whi ch , according 
to his tabl e , 5 2  have been accomplished and those which are 
s t i l l  being sought. 
Of the relations between the Federal Republi c  and the 
German Democratic Republ i c ,  Wolfgang Wagner , writing in 
Europa Archiv commented : 
The Basic Treaty concluded between the Federal 
�epublic of Germany and the German Democratic Republi c  
o n  2 1  December 1 9 7 2  represents the climax, i f  not the 
conclusion , of the Ostpo l itik instituted by the Brandt­
Scheel government in 1969 . 
• 
. . W ith the Basic Treaty and i ts codicils and the 
agreements that are to follow, Ostpo l itik has achieved 
its aim of es tablishing a modus vivendi in Germany which , 
to use Chancellor W i l ly Brandt ' s  words , al lows oppos i tion 
between the Federal Republ ic and the GDR to become a 
"regulated coexistence. 5 3 
He then continues in his comments by stating that, by the 
treaties with the Federal Repub l i c ,  the GDR has placed 
itself in_ an unparalleled position among the communist 
countries of Eas tern Europe becaus e ,  in his word s ,  " She 
will be the only State in the Socialist camp that has signed 
a treaty with a Western State promising to open i ts borders 
with the Wes t . " 5 4  The question o f  the status o f  East 
Germany is not the only problem in Central Europe at this 
time , however . 
5 2P l ischke , "West German Foreign and Defense Policy , "  
pp. 1104- 1 1 0 5 . 
5 3 Wol fgang Wagner, "A Modus Vivendi in Germany , "  The 
German ·Tribune Quarterly Review, ( March 2 2 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ,  p. -=r:-
54 Ibid . , p. 1 0 .  
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Ostpo l i t i k ,  at the end of 19 7 2 ,  has not completed a l l  
its efforts o r  goals . I t  i s  also not w i thout comment , both 
positive and negative. Notes of the continuing presence of 
West German foreign policy after the signing of the Basic 
Treaty are noted in two separate issues of The German 
5 5  Tribune , one by Wolfgang Wagner and another by Theo 
Sommer , 56 and both of which are reprints from West German 
newspape rs.  Indeed, Chancellor Brandt summed up the si tu-
ation fol lowing the end of the year 1 9 7 2  when, as a keynote 
to his speech before the Bundestag, January 1 8 ,  19 7 3 , he 
' d  w b · 1d h h b h '  d 57 · sai , " e can ui upon w at as een ac ieve , "  noting 
that there is probably no end in sight to the path of 
Ostpo l i t i k ;  i t  has much t o  d o  and contribute t o  the world 
before it runs its cours e .  The diary of events , reprinted 
from The German Tribune , ·  and included in the appendix, 
shows that the history of the Federal Republi c  of Germany, 
in its few short years , has been full of foreign pol i cy-
related involvemen t ,  many of which can and w i l l  be related 
to Ostpolitik. 
5 5wol fgang Wagner , " Basic Treaty Underlines the German 
Di lemma , "  The German Tribune, March 1 ,  197 3 ,  p. 1 .  
56Theo Sommer , "Basic Treaty Ushers In a New Era in 
German Affairs , "  The German Tribune , January 4 ,  19 7 3 ,  p .  1 .  
5 7wil ly Brand t ,  "Policy Statemen t , " Supplement to The 
Bulletin,  XXI ( J anuary 2 3 , 197 3 ) ,  p.  1 .  
CHAPTER IV 
OSTPOLITIK: AN ANALYSIS 
With conclusion of  the historical perspective the 
foundation has been established for the systemic analysis 
of the l i terature. In using the paradigm as a structured 
guide for the analysis o f  Ostpolitik,  the material on the 
subject must be organized in an orderly manner. The steps 
involved in the analysi s ,  each being e i ther directly or 
indirectly interrelated and associa ted with the major intent 
of this study, w i l l  commence with the notation and discussion 
o f the phases in the development of post-World War I I  
Ostpolitik. W ith this step conclud e d ,  a modular adaptation 
of the paradigm w i l l  be u t i l i zed to dissect the li terature 
into di fferent parts of the system. A reminder should be 
noted here that the material used in this analysis does not 
encompass a complete survey of the existing li terature ; nor 
does i t  include all  inputs , outputs , or other affectors of 
the systemic model .  The components for the analysis are 
taken only from those sources included in e i ther the 
Literature Review ( Chapter I I )  or the overview of Ostpo l i tik 
( Chapter I I I ) .  For the purpose of this analys i s ,  the 
post-World War I I  Ostpoli tik of the Federal Republic will 
be divided into three phas e s :  I .  The Adenauer Era 
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( including the government of his successor , Ludwig Erhard ) ;  
I I !  The Grand Coali tion Era; I I I .  The Brandt- Scheel Era 
( through December , 1 9 7 2 ) .  
Step 1 :  A Discussion of the Phases of Ostpoli tik 
For the purpose of qualifying the phases of the 
development of Ostpo l i tik a number of points will be made 
under each and explained in light o f  the paradigm. These 
points will serve as the basis for the inputs , outputs , 
and other information included in the second step o f  the 
analysi s ;  the adaptation of the paradigm. While the preced-
ing chapter provides a detailed historical perspective, the 
fol lowing phases will provide the generalizations of the 
times and the structuring of the material f or use in Step 2 ,  
a necessary forerunner to the analysis through the paradigm. 
I .  The Adenauer Era. The Adenauer Era officially began 
in 1949, but the stage was set in 1945 with the defeat o f  
Germany. 
1 .  The posture of Europe after World War I I :  the 
destruction of the mil itary might of Germany with two out­
side powers , the United States and the Soviet Union , holding 
supreme authority. 
Prior to 1949 postwar ·Germany was under mili tary control 
implemented by the four major allied coun tries , only one o f  
which, France , was considered a continental European country. 
Great Britain was s t i l l  European but was more of a loser 
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than a winner from the war even though she was victorious 
on the battlefield. The Soviet Union was semi-European 
but was stil l considered very much an outsider. The most 
distant power, and the big winner from the war was the 
United States . Hence , the fate o f  postwar Germany was in 
the hands o f  two outsiders. If Germany were united in 
1949 under the domination of the United States and the 
Wes t ,  the security of the Soviet Union would be threatened. 
I f  united under the control of the Soviet Union, the 
security of the Wes t would be threatened. If united under 
no control , the security of both sides could be threatened. 
As a result of this need for security on the part of the 
major powers ,  Germany in 1949 became a divided nation , 
posing no real threat to e i ther side.  
2.  The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer , firmly implanted 
in Western ideas. 
The adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 and the f ounding of 
the Federal Republ ic were encouraged by the powers occupy-
ing Western zones . W ith the division of Germany, the 
intention of the Western a l l i es--France , Britain, and the 
United States--was to allow the people of their zones to 
become unified and pelf-governing. This was to be done 
under close ties with the three alli es . 
3 .  Konrad Adenauer ' s  attempts to defeat the Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe through a " showca s e "  West Germany. 
Konrad Adenauer , a firm defender of democracy and an 
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opponent of communism, believed that through competition , 
specifically in economic areas , the forces of communism in 
Eastern Europe could be defeated. The inclusion of West 
Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
European Economic Community (Common Market ) ,  the Counci l  
o f  Europe, and the European Coal and Steel Communi ty ,  along 
with the Marshall Plan of redevelopment by the United States , 
engrained competition between East and Wes t .  The Federal 
Republi c ,  being an important part of each of these and other 
organizations , became deeply involved in this competition. 
4. The establishment of the Hallstein Doctrine. 
The Hallstein Doctrine adopted by the Adenauer government 
withheld West German recognition from any government of a 
foreign country which recognized the existence and legiti-
macy o f the East German government.  Adenauer ' s  policy was 
to deny the existence of the German Democratic Republic 
and simultaneously for the Federal government to act as a 
spokesman for all German s .  With the establi shment of 
countermeasures by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 
which included the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the 
continuation ·of the Berlin problem, this po l i cy was not 
strictly adhered to� 
5 .  The opening of diplomatic relations between the 
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. 
By 1 9 5 5  the Adenauer government had realized i t  could no 
longer fol low the Hallstein Doctrine as strictly as i t  had 
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hoped. The threat of non-recognition or of economic 
sanctions by the Federal Republic could not pose a realistic 
threat to some countrie s ,  especially the Soviet Union. The 
Adenauer government realized that a non- communicative status 
with the Soviet Union would hinder the Federal Republ i c  
more than the U . S . S . R .  
6 .  The successor o f  Adenauer under the CDU/CSU 
government ,  Ludwig Erhard. 
Upon the resignation of Konrad Adenpuer , Ludwig Erhard 
assumed control of the CDU/CSU and the government .  Under 
his leadership the foreign po licies of his predecessor were 
maintained. There were no significant changes in policy 
during his two terms as Chancel lor.  The appearance was 
that even though Adenauer had resigned his thoughts s t i l l  
prevai l ed .  
I I .  The Grand Coalition Era. The resignation o f  Ludwig 
Erhard in 1963 called for new Bundestag elections . A 
growing diss atisfaction w i th the CDU/CSU governments led 
the West German electorate to cast a controlling vote for 
no party. 
1 .  The assention of the Grand Coalition government 
to control of the Bundestag. 
As a result of the 1963 election , a coalition government of 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD was established. With Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger and W illy Brandt as Chancel lor and Vice Chancellor-
Foreign Minister , respecti vel y ,  new ideas were brought into 
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the Bonn government and included within the decision-making 
process. 
2 .  The renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine by 
Kiesinger . 
The Federal government had long since recognized the impo-
tency of the Hallstein Doctrine and had ignored i t  for some 
time. It was , however, s t i l l  an official policy of the 
Federal Republic. In light of i ts inconsis tency with the 
needs o� the Federal Republi c  at the time , Kiesinger 
announced the official dropping of the doctrine , an official 
break with the past. Under the Grand Coalition CDU/C SU- SPD 
government the trend changed to a responsive and " realisti c "  
approach o f  the times--recognizing the d e  facto s i tuation 
in Europe. 
3 .  The reliance of the Federal Republic on the Soviet 
Union as a primary negotiating partner; the tied hands of 
its satel l i t e s .  
The Kiesinger government had made preliminary steps toward 
negotiations with Eastern European countries and had made 
considerable progress with some. However , with the Czech 
Crisis of 1968 , the Federal Republ i c  reali zed the importance 
of negotiating first with East Europe ' s  master--the Soviet 
Union. The Ostpo l itik suffered setbacks from this costly 
real ization , but eventually regained momentum. It should 
be noted , the Kiesinger government was s t i l l  contro l led 
by the CDU/CSU,  which was more conservative in foreign 
affairs than its partner , the SPD. This helps to account 
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for the sluggish innovations of the Grand Coalition. 
I I I .  The Brandt- S cheel Era.  The inability o f  I:urt Georg 
Kiesinger to maintain a majority of votes in the Bundestag, 
due to a lack of support by its coalition SPD party, led 
to new elections in 1969 , through which a new government 
came to power . 
1 .  The Brandt-Scheel regime assends to power in the 
Federal Republ i c .  
Wi th the Brandt-Scheel ( SPD-FDP ) government o f  196 9 ,  came 
a new era in Ostpol itik .  The atti tudes of the West German 
people had changed on topics of foreign affairs , and they 
were ready for reconc i l i ation and negotiation. The new 
government brought new ideas into the decision-making arena; 
for the first time in the his tory of the Federal Republi c  
the CDU/CSU was the opposition while the Socialists ( SP D )  
and Free Democrats (FDP ) held a maj ority in the Bundes tag. 
This coalition government represented ambttious new ideas 
in Bonn ' s  Ostpo l i tik.  
2 .  The Moscow Treaty i s  signed on August 1 2 ,  1970 . 
The Moscow Treaty paved the way for negotiations and detente 
in Europe. Fol lowing the plan of his predecesso r ,  Brandt 
reali z ed he must first negotiate with Moscow before he 
could work w i th the Eastern European leaders. In this 
treaty both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republi c  
renounced the u s e  of force to change any boundarie s ;  any 
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dispute between the two should be settled by peaceful rather 
than forceful means. The mere recognition of the control 
of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was a cornerstone in 
Brandt ' s  Ostpo l i t i k .  
3 .  The Polish Treaty i s  signed on December 7 ,  1970 . 
After first recogn i zing the superiority of the Soviet Union 
in Eastern Europe, the Federal Republ ic could deal directly 
with other commun i s t  capi tals.  A logical point of initi ation 
would be to recogn i z e  the de facto s i tuation in Europe 
resulting from the Second World War . Since negotiations 
with East Germany were very slow ,  Bonn turned to a problem 
existing with the People ' s  Republic o f  Poland. From the 
end of World War I I ,  there were di sputed claims over former 
German terri tory , now a part o f  Poland. Through the West 
German- Polish Treaty the Federal Republic finally recognized 
the Oder-Neisse line as the Western boundary of Poland , 
end ing all claims to former East Prussian territory. In 
return Bonn would receive favorable treatment in regard to 
problems of Germans living in these regions. 
4. The Federal Republic negotiaties with the German 
Democratic Republi c .  
In 197 0 , Bonn also negotiated with the other half of the 
German nation. Through the conferences held at Erfurt and 
Kassel , in East and West Germany respectively , t�e leaders 
of the two states explored the possibi l i ties of the rel ax-
ation of tensions. These two conferences yielded few 
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substantive results , but they did open the medium for 
communication. The greatest hindrance appeared to be the 
East German Premier ' s  unwillingness to compromise ; the 
initiative for compromise would have to come from the 
Federal Republi c .  
5 .  The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin clari f i es 
the city ' s  situation. 
The claim had long been made by East Berlin ( the communi s t  
governmen t )  that a l l  of the city , including the former 
Western zones , were a part of East Germany. This s i tuation 
caused friction not only between the two German governments 
but also between the former war allies and protectors of 
the city. This agreement officially recognized West Berlin 
as being independent of East Germany and legitimized the 
use of West Berlin for Wes t German functions ; the right of 
free and uninhibited access was also guaranteed by the 
cosigners. This left the G . D . R . in an indefensible s i tu� 
ation ; the Soviet Union, its own ally , had compromised the 
German Democratic position. 
6. The Basic Treaty between the two states in the 
German nation is signed on December 2 1 ,  1 9 7 2 .  
Wi th new stages o f  detente being reached a l l  around Europe 
the potential feeling of pressure for negotiation between 
Bonn and East Berlin was evident. Due to a relaxation o f  
demands o n  both sides , the two German governments reached 
agreements in the area of transportation and travel between 
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the two state s ,  and ultimately a bas i c  treaty of de facto 
recognition and cooperation . A new era , with new attitudes , 
began in Germany with peaceful coexistence overriding 
hosti l i ty for the German people. 
With the selection of the above- stated phases o f  
Os tpoli tik from 1949 to 197 2 ,  the stage is set for the 
modular adaptation. However , before the model i s  studied , 
i t  would be useful to view all the phases of Ostpoli tik 
as a whole.  The visualization of the entire period to be 
used in the model is given in Illustration VI , pages 59-60. 
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ILLUSTRATION VI 
The Phases of Ostpoli tik 
I .  The Adenauer Era ( 1949- 1966 ) 
1 .  The Posture of Europe after World War I I :  the 
destruction of the mil itary might of Germany with two out­
side powers , the United States and the Soviet Union, holding 
supreme authori ty . 
2 .  The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany , 
under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer , firmly implanted 
in Western idea s .  
3 .  Konrad Adenauer ' s  a ttempts to defeat the Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe through a " showcase" West Germany. 
4 .  The establishment of the Hallstein Doctrine. 
5 .  The opening of diplomatic relations between the 
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. 
6 .  The successor of Adenauer under the CDU/CSU 
government ,  Ludwig Erhard. 
I I .  The Grand Coalition Era ( 1966- 1969 ) 
1 .  The assention of the Grand Coalition government 
to control of the Bundestag. 
2 .  The renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine by 
Kiesinger. 
3 .  The reliance of the Federal Republic on the 
Soviet Union as a primary negotiating partner ; the tied 
hands of its satellites. 
I I I .  The Brandt- Scheel Era ( 1 969- 1 9 7 2 )  
1 .  The Brandt-Scheel regime ascends to power i n  the 
Federal Republic.  
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2 .  The Mos cow Treaty is signed on August 1 2 ,  1 9 7 0 .  
3 .  The Polish Treaty is signed on December 7 ,  1 9 7 0 .  
4 .  The Federal Republic negotiates with the German 
Democratic Republi c .  
5 .  The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin clari f i es 
the city ' s  s i tuation . 
6 .  The Basic Treaty between. the two states in the 
German nation is signed on December 2 1 ,  197 2 .  
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The previous points do not cover a l l  aspects o f  the 
phases of Ostpolitik,  but they do serve as a basis for 
analysis in the model. As the i l lustration shows , and 
the preceding discussion supports , a trend in West Germany ' s  
Ostpolitik , a trend leading to greater detente , had been 
growing and flourishing since the later years of the 
Adenauer Era . W ith the establ ishment of diplomatic relations 
between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, the 
idea of ignoring and not recognizing the European s i tuation 
was being waved aside. Through a series of events and 
changing atti tudes of both the populace and the decision­
makers , the trend towards detente was initiated. The 
different factors of this trend serve as the basis for the 
modular approach of the second step o f  this analysi s ,  which 
will dissect the phases into specific systemic component s .  
The preceding i l lustrations and discussions are not meant 
to show a trend of constant improvements with no setbacks , 
for , indeed , this i s not the case. The purpose of Step 1 
was to provide a basis of generalizations for use in the 
modular adaptations of the phases of Ostpo l i t i k .  The process 
of Step 2 will reveal the setbacks as well as the impro.v.e­
ments in detente. 
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Step 2 :  A Modular Adaptation of Ostpolitik;  Inputs and 
Outputs Affecting the West German 
Decision-Making Arena 
The test of any study ' s  validity comes when the 
material is placed in the paradigm. This step of the 
analysis will be prominent in the determination of the 
validity and applicability of the systemic approach to 
Ostpo l i tik.  Since the first step of the analysis has 
broken down the study of Ostpolitik from 1949 to 1 97 2 ,  
into three distinct periods , this s egment w i l l  �ollow the 
same pattern. In this manner continuity can be maintained 
and the material of Step 1 can be best u t i l i zed . For this 
modular adaptation the paradigm components w i l l  be changed 
only to a minimal extent ;  the "Decision-Making Arena" w i l l  
be replaced in wording by " Ins truments of Conversion" to 
provide a more significant link between the inputs and 
outputs , and the differentiation between internal and 
external feedback will not be noted in the mode l .  As 
Illustration VI I denotes, each term used in the model i s  
defined. One important qualification of the i l lustration 
is that there is no lateral connection between inputs. and 
outputs directly horizontal to each other; Forces for 
Change are not necessarily the inputs which yield Desirable 
Resul t s .  The same is true with Forces for Status Quo . and 
Undesirable Results . 
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I l lustration VI I 
Modular Adaptation: Empty Model w i th Terms* 
INPUTSa OUTPUTS b 
Fore.es for Chawlse c Oeslrable. Resut-ts f r !NST�ENTS r � CONVERSION e Forces Tor St� O.u.o d Undesirab(e 'Resu.l-ts g 
l ...... -----cc FEEOBACKh ..... ___ ) 
* Refer to I l lustration 5 ,  CHAPTER I .  This i s  an adap-
tation of the paradigm o f  this study. 
NOTE: There i s  no lateral connection between Forces 
for Change and Desirable Results , or between Forces for 
Status Quo and Undesirable Results . 
a INPUTS- the demands ,  such as needs , desires and other 
parameter s ,  which enter into and affect the West German 
Decision-Making Arena or the INSTRUMENTS OF CONVERSION. 
bOUTPUTS� the resulting conditions which are yielded 
by a pol i tical system. 
cForces for Change- INPUTS which demand alteration or 
modification within the system or a systemic replacement. 
dForces for Status Quo-. INPUTS which demand continua­
tion of present conditions . 
eINSTRUMENTS OF CONVERSION- the policies or procedures 
which allow for , or facilitate, the transformation of INPUTS 
into OUTPUTS .· These are operatives of the Decision-Making 
Arena. 
£Desirable Results- OUTPUTS which are favorable ( posi­
tive ) to West German Decis ion-Makers .  
gUndesirable Results- OUTPUTS which are unfavorable 
( negative) to West German Decis ion-Maker s .  
hFEEDBACK- the influence OUTPUTS have on that system 
and future systemic INPUTS . 
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With the introduction and presentation o f  the model 
completed, the emphasis now is to i l lustrate the different 
phases of Ostpo l i tik. Before doing thi s ,  however , there 
remain a few notes to mention: 
1 .  Unless otherwise indicated ( * ) ,  the inputs and 
outputs relate or refer to West German decision-makers , or , 
the cond i tions within the Fe<ii·eral Republi c .  When indicated 
( * )  the reference is to the U . S . , U . S . S . R . , and to their 
a l l i e s .  
2 .  FEEDBACK w i l l  not be noted in the � llustration , 
but w i l l  be discussed in an explanatory papagraph following 
the i l lustration. 
3 .  The INSTRUMENTS OF CONVBRSION have been determined 
by an indepth study of the li terature .  As the study of 
Ostpo l i tik progressed , there were a number of policies or 
procedures ( indicators ) which stood out in each era . These 
have been determined , subj ectively , as being the principle 
components of this part of the model . 
The inputs into the system must be dis tinguishable between 
being internal and external .  Therefor e ,  since most of the 
inputs to be included i n  the model are from within the 
Federal Republic and on its own decision-makers , a note 
w i l l  be made when there are exceptions to the norm. Also, 
since i t  i s  evident that the adaptation of the material to 
the modular form should represent a dynamic proces s ,  the 
components of the paradigm labeled INPUTS and OUTPUTS : and 
their subcategories are related through a feedback process ;  
the INPUTS of one phase are e i ther direcely or indirectly 
linked to the OUTPUTS of the preceding phase of Ostpo l i t i k .  
It should a l s o  be noted here that the phases o f  Ostpo l i tik 
used in this analysis are not necessarily easily divisible 
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or from d i s tinct separations in substantive foreign policy ; 
the relative governmental changes serve as good break points 
for analys i s .  
I .  The Adenauer Era. The period o f  1949 to 196 3 ,  i s  
represented i n  I l lustration VI I I ,  which lists the component 
parts of the model presented previously in this chapter. 
I llustration VI I I  
Modular Adaptation: The Adenauer Era with Components 
INPUTS OUTPUTS 
Forces pr Change 
R�rtification 
Sec.u.rity * 
Desire to spuk for 
&.st' Gei"Wl41t s 
Commu.rllc.o.tion UJtth 
U..S .S.R. 
Mew Bu.�5 
\eodu�htp 
INS1R.UM£NTS 
OF' 
CoNVERS\ON 
N4-llste\t\ DomLrl� 
EE'C 
Co\lnci\ .t Europe 
NATO 
Mt.��o.lA 1>lcU\ 
Soviet r�\)r\so.. ls 
Dip\omo..+ie- �� �*k u.s.s.�. 
�u-.. a-kard 
�u trU\Sw 
• u..s . , u.s . s . R  . .. fk.� �av 4\l\es . 
Uncks\r�bl� �t.�"'-i+s 
D\�isao� of' Germ�y 
AHO\a.-li� of Eo.s+� 
�"•ee C),,d Son\e 
1hlnJ \Jlorlcl $� . 
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On the input side of the model the forces which 
demanded change are numerous .  Reunification was a demand 
o f  most Germans within the Federal Repub l i c ,  and was a goal 
of the decision-maker s .  Security i n  Europe and i n  Germany 
were important. For this reason security was a question 
which the former war a l lies were highly concerned w i th .  
I t  was also a question confronting the German people ;  they 
had to wait for some sort of agreement between the major 
powers before the German question could be settled . Control 
of a l l  of Germany was the source of many tensions in the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Simultaneously , the Federal Republic insisted on the right 
to speak for a l l  Germans while the German Democratic Republic 
refutes this claim. Communication with the Soviet Union 
and its need were recognized by the Adenauer government ;  
this was necessary to carry on negotiations on a German 
settlement. As of the early sixties , and w i th the building 
of the Berlin Wal l ,  there was a call for new leadership in 
the Bundestag which could provide new direction. On the 
other hand the inputs which demanded or required no change 
were the polf tical stabi l i ty in the Federal Republic of few 
governmental changes , economic growth and prosperity intti­
ated by the government ,  and the CDU/CSU control of the 
Bundestag which meant li ttle change in government and in 
public opinion. 
- 6 7-
The outputs yielded by the Adenauer Era are also many 
and varied. With regards to desirable resul ts , the Adenauer 
government succeeded in alienating East Germany and its 
I 
communist government from the West and many non- aligned 
countries by means of the Hallstein Doctrine. The ECC , 
Council of Europe, NATO , and the Marshall Plan helped 
f i rmly to implant the Federal Republic in the Wes t ,  while 
these same organizations and programs , when balanced by the 
Warsaw Pact and similar communi s t  countermeasures , helped 
maintain the Cold War security of Europe. Diplomatic ties 
between the Federal Republi c  and the Soviet Union in 1 9 5 5  
helped to break down the many barriers placed between them 
by past policies , including the above-mentioned group of 
organizations. The Adenauer resignation brought no new 
ideas or substantive changes in the Bonn government .  
Undesirable outcome s ,  however , were · the division of Germany 
and the alienation of many small countries, both in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere ,  most of which was a result of the 
same policies and instruments wh�ch brought the favorable 
changes and outcome s .  
Along the feedback loop there were many indicators 
which led in one of· either two bas i c  directions. As the 
outputs followed the loops the desirable results were 
likely to ga�n momentum and be included in the following 
inputs .  At the same time the undesirable outputs , those 
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which are unfavorable to the 'decision-makers , were e i ther 
likely to remain and gain new strength or they would die 
out due to their opposition before they become inputs in 
the next phas e .  To be speci f i c  in describ�ng the feedback 
process of the Adenauer Era and i ts transition to the era 
of the Grand Coali tion , the alienation of the G . D . R .  remained 
a problem which required new approaches or new objectives 
concerning the solution to the question of reuni fication. 
The development of a Western culture increased the ideo-
logical distance between the governments of Bonn and East 
Berlin while the security of Europe , in its stalemated 
posi t i o n,  did not aid in the reconci li ation of opposing 
views. This posture was accented by the lack of change 
in the Bonn governments atti tudes , even with a new chancel-
lor. Although there were diplomatic relations between Bonn 
and Moscow , the German nation remained divided and Bonn 
became stagnant in the eyes of many countries throughout 
the world. A change was needed and the existing system 
would not provide i t .  
· I I .  The Grand Coali tion Era. With the resignation of 
' 
Ludwig Erhard in 1 9 6 6  came new elections for the Bundestag. 
These elections yielded a new government ,  a coalition 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The inputs into the 
system in this phase were varied and often qui te different 
from those in the preceding Adenauer Era. These new inputs 
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resulted from new as wel l as old factor s ,  often coming from 
the feedback process. I l lustration IX deta i l s  the components 
o f  this era : 
Illustration IX 
Modu lar Adaptation: The Grand Coalition with Components 
IN1>UTS OUTPUTS 
fOC"us fot- CbA,�e 
Reu.ni fl'oa.-h'� 
Pu.bl \c. opi�ion 
I�e.l  
"'tk v..s.s. R. 
Rft.d for new MUkth 
Fecqs .for StpM.,s {)W> 
Eco�oWlLc gro� 
?ot�hW ��  
Sewmy W\ �ope 
�STRVME�1S 
Or 
co�\JER.SlON 
c. Q-l.�-\-\� .30"�"W\ 
Re.nu.�c.\4.-\\°"- o{. 
th. u.sftt" i(X,tn�'"' 
��� �\� &.� 5.t,ro�� 
S.�t.� 
�tlV\v.� 6u.v-part" 
cf �Pt\o , EE�, � 
C.D\l.-.ci.l of � 
P<;s\r�le �vJ� 
Net.u � v.>',-\-k 
� E.wo� 
Neu> � "' FeduJ 
bO\)eo\M� 
iJ,\'.des ir� Re.sulh 
n'rM � � u..s.s.t<. 
i� wt Ew-o� i 
C;ztdl\ Cr\.�(� 
CO\di.�\ol� Q.\\li SUH\ 
� 6erMtU'.'f 
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In terms o f· the inputs into the system in thi s phase 
of Ostpoli tik the forces for change and for status guo 
were more balanced than in the Adenauer Era. Reuni fication 
was s t i l l  a demand of the decision-makers , although i t  was 
not as. strong as it had been. Public opinion represented 
new trends toward reconc i l i ation with the East instead o f  
confrontation. Fewer people in the F ederal Republi c  thought 
o f  reunif ication as an immediate goal .  Along this same line 
the desire to increase relations w i th the Eastern European 
states , in order to open up more markets for West German 
goods and to decrease tension on an overall bas i s ,  was a 
primary objective of the era. Other s ,  however, argued that 
since the Federal Republic was expe riencing unprecedented 
economic growth w i thout ties with the East,  the Federal 
Republic should not upset the status guo .  With these uneasy 
feelings toward new economic ventures came apprehension of 
unbalancing the po l i tical stability of the Federal Republ i c  
by moving in new directions in foreign affairs . 
Resulting from these inputs were new ideas i n  the 
Federal government ,  brought about by a new coalition incorpo­
rating new decision-makers with bold new plans , and new 
stages of relations· w i th Eastern European states facili tated 
by the renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine and the new 
ideas in governmen t.  Likewi s e ,  there were also undesirable 
results from the Grand Coalition ' s  policies ; the policy of 
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. 
negotiating directly and extensively with the Eastern 
Europeans led the Soviet Union to exert its influence and 
insti l l  and reaffirm their superiority in Eastern Europe--
the Czech Crisis of 1968. The idea of neglecting the Soviet 
Union also helped to reinforce East German indignation 
toward Bonn. 
The feedback loop connecting the phase of the Grand 
Coalition with its successor could be seen as being promis-
ing. The negative results o f  the Czech Crisis and the 
division of Germany supported the ideas that negotiations 
must begin in Moscow and then spread out to the Eastern 
European capi tals . The Czech Crisis taught Bonn not to 
expect too much in the initial phases of negotiation s .  
The new relations with Eastern Europe and the new ideas 
instigated during the three years of the Grand Coali tion 
helped transform the prevai ling attitudes of both public 
and offic�al opinions from hostility and alienation to 
those of reserved hope for detente. 
III . The Brandt- Scheel Era. With the Bundestag elections 
of 1969 came new ideas set within a new government. As 
Illus tration X shows , thi� phase of Ostpolitik is signifi-
cant in its accomplishments and yet remains embedded in 
the past. 
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I l lustration X 
Modular Adaptation: The Brandt-Scheel Era with Components 
IN'PUTS 0 UTPUTS 
ForeflS :.f?or �e 
Sin.tu..� � 6UMQ.�'f 
5to.�s or 'B� 
Pu.b\ic, o-pti\bt\ 
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Stc.uriiy \\\ Ev.ro� � 
Mascow\r� 
'Po\t�h 'f re.o...hj 
�rf\vtt Kas�d 
a.o� 
�u.D!r\ �t, Aaree-­
�t o�'euli; 
Ef<.C:>.-G .o. R .  
&rkM. trcute.l 
%rt.eW-� 
&sk Treo..ry 
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eold r\d.U �&eas '"' -rl4� 
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p. Ma&u \/\�  \"' 
�� 
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c)f 6erM.� 
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Under the Brandt-Scheel government ,  the demands on 
the decis ion-making process differed from the pas t. The 
question of reunification was no longer prevalent; i t  was 
replaced by the question of ±he status of Germany. Under 
Brandt ,  the phrase " two states within the German nation" 
was the theme. This government was faced with the recog­
nition of de facto Europe and had to face the problems of 
not only the status of Germany, but of Berlin as w e l l .  The 
Bonn government was not alone in answering these questions , 
however , as these were also concerns of the major powers. 
Needs for more permanent situations in Berlin and Germany 
required decis i ons on these issues. The public opinion of 
the West German population supported the ideas of the 
SPD-FDP government as i t  sought detente and new directions 
in foreign policy. The need for new markets also prompted 
new direction; the ever-expanding Wes t German economy was 
being hindered by oversupplied markets elsewhere in the 
world and needed the consumers of Eastern Europe. The only 
major drawback to change was the fear, both at home and 
abroad , that the new initiatives of the Federal Republic 
might upset the balance of power in EuFope and with it the 
security of the continent. 
The outcomes of the Brandt-Scheel era to 1972  were as 
varied as the inputs. Bold new ideas were represented by 
decision-makers in positions of authority. The FDP had its 
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opportunity for the first time to be a signifi cant part of 
a government and brought with i t  ideas responsive to the 
times . As indicated by the policies noted in I l lustration X ,  
a modus vivendi ( a  practical situation ) existed i n  Germany. 
Through the Moscow Treaty both the Federal Republic and the 
Soviet Union rej ected the use of force to change territorial 
boundari es . The Federal Republic was realistic in 
acknowledging the Oder-Neisse line established by the Polish 
Treaty as the Western boundary of Poland , a source of 
friction between the two states for many years . The two 
German states went to the bargaining table at Erfurt and 
Kassel , the first major break through in F . R . G. -G . D . R . 
relations , while the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin 
cleared the Berlin issue of control and authority and paved 
the way for the travel agreement between East and West 
Germany to and from Berlin. By means of these major 
component instruments the Federal Republ i c  has been recog­
nized as a s incere agent of detente and European security 
has , if anything , increased . However , as a result of the 
Basic Treaty, the question of the division of Germany into 
two states appears to be accepted by Bonn as a necessary 
condition to peace end detente. 
Having discussed the systemic adaptation of each phase 
of Ostpolitik, the remaining task of this analysis � s  to 
place all three phases together , thereby revealing the 
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systems analysis of Ostpo litik from 1949 to 1972 as a 
complete uni t .  Illustration XI i s  the combination of the 
three phases of Ostpolitik, from Adenauer to Brandt.  
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In studying I l lustration XI , one major difference from 
the preceding three diagrams is evident. I l lustration XI 
includes the components of the feedback proces s .  This i s  
the proper time for inclusion i n  an i l lustration because 
the components of feedback represent influences of outputs 
in a transitional period , or inter-sys tem phase. The solid 
directional lines show the course of the outputs of one 
system as they are converted into the inputs o f  the following 
system. The dotted ( broken) directional lines indicate an 
indirect or secondary influence of outputs , through feedback , 
on the inputs of that same system. This line is broken 
because the inter-era feedback is a result o f  outputs which 
that system is incapable of handling-- thus a systemic change . 
Again , i t  is necessary to mention that the components 
included in this and previous i l lustrations throughout this 
chapter are not meant to be inclusive of a l l  the inputs , 
outputs , instruments of conversi o n ,  or facets o f  f�edback. 
They are , however, representative of the material on 
Ostpolitik. The remaining task of this study is to determine 
the validity and applicability of the paradigm, which will 
be included in the fol lowing chapter , explaining the con­
clusions of this study. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the word Ostpo l i tik i s  by no means new, 
its basic use has changed since the late sixties so that 
i t  now could be viewed as a radical and bold new approach 
toward Otto von Bismarck ' �  old clich� , Realp�l i t i k .  This 
does not mean a state of "realistic politics " in a 
Bismarck i an sense; the personal i ties involved have changed 
and along with them new ideas for new times resulted in new 
parameters wh�ch Bi smarckian Realpol itik would not permit.  
The Federal Republ i c  i s  not operating in a vacuum ; i t  exists 
in an environment which applies many different pressures 
toward the fu lfil lment of outside , as well as inside, 
interests . The . allied powers o f  World War I I  have for over 
two decades exerted , either directly or indirectly, inf lu­
ences contrary to the goals of the German peop l e ,  and these 
people have been forced to adapt to outsi�e pressures . 
Any concluding remarks in this paper must relate the 
German s i tuation to the major intent of the study. The 
maj o r  intent of this study, as stated in CHAPTER I ,  was to 
investigate the appl icability of the paradigm utilizing 
two major idea s ,  the first of which was to determine whether 
the understood trends of Ostpoli tik , .  as represented i n  the 
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historical primary and secondary material s ,  can be studied 
by the application of the paradigm of this study. The 
second method of implementing the intent of the study was 
to determine whether the use of the paradigm of a systems 
approach can make the study of Ostpoli tik more systematic 
and clear . Both of these statements w i l l  be the guidelines 
for the following remarks. Before the validity or applica­
bility are discussed, however , i t  must be understood that 
there are both advantages and disadvantages to a systems 
approach as designed in this study. One advantage to a 
general systems approach i s  that i t  provides an abstraction 
of model-bu ilding, which emphasizes generalizations while 
omitting detai l s .  As the same tim e ,  however , a systems 
approach suffers from a distortion effect due to the absence 
of deta i l s .  Abstractions which do not include details can 
distort reality whi le intending to increase insight and 
clarity. It is because of the possibility of distortion 
that an historical analysis or summation is beneficial , as 
in CHAPTER I I I .  The application of the historical approach 
is useful in its description of the details o f  Ostpolitik 
in a chronological perspective of the international scene. 
Reflections on the Systems Approach 
For the purposes of this study , conclusions towards 
the use of a systemic approach will be made for each of the 
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three eras of the 1949- 1 9 7 2  period used in the analysis 
( CHAPTER IV ) :  I .  The Adenauer Era ; I I .  The Grand Coali tion 
Era ; and, I I I .  The Brandt- Scheel Era.  The validity of a 
systemic approach can be tested by viewing its consistency; 
contradictions within the parameters of the system would 
lead to inefficiency in the methodology which could result 
in a distortion of reality .  In order for a systems approach 
to be efficient and applicabl e ,  the INPUTS , INSTRUMENTS OF 
CONVERSION, and OUTPUTS should fol low a consis tent pattern; 
if there is a contradiction within the pattern, a systems 
approach might not be best. The most efficient way of 
revealing contradiction or consistency within the system 
appears to be to view the center of the model , the 
INSTRUMENTS OF CONVERSION. Being the policies or procedures 
which link the outputs to the inputs , they are essential to 
the system. If these instruments are contradictory they 
wi l l  yield inconsistent results which are , therefore , 
unsystemat i c .  
I .  The Adenauer Era.  The most apparent visualization of 
the Adenauer era was the a ttempt to achieve goals by 
strength in the Western ties . The Common Marke t ,  NATO , 
and the Marshall Plan strengthened the position of the 
Federal Republic with its Western a l lies ; these po licies 
were all consistent with each other . · There i s  one major 
inconsis tency in the Adenauer phase of Ostpo l i tik.  The 
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Bonn . government was insistent upon the implementation of 
the Hallstein Doctrine in the early years of the Adenauer 
administration. Yet , in 1955, the same government broke 
its own policy and established diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union, the country respons�ble for the establi sh­
ment of the German Democratic Republic. This major break 
in a cons i s tent system is explainable through a view of 
realism, but it i l lustrates a systemic fai lure. This 
fai lure is probably more of an inadequacy in the chosen 
time sequence than in any major substantive aspect of the 
mod e l .  The Adenauer Era might have been divided into two 
segments , before and after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. This separation , however , 
would not serve the purpose of a clear division either , for 
even though Bonn recognized the Moscow government , it sti l l  
applied the Hallstein Doctrine to the smaller states with 
which it had economic relations . A realization of the 
futility of applying the Hallstein Doctr ine to the Soviet 
Union caused Adenauer to recognize the U . S . S . R. , but not 
abandon the doctrine for all foreign governments . In this 
sense the era of Konrad Adenauer and L�dwig Erhard yielded 
a contradiction in policy. Therefor e ,  in this instance a 
systemic analys�s could be invalid or inappropriate. 
I I .  The Grand Coal ition Era. The government o f  Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger partially modified the po licies of i ts predecessors. 
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New demands forced breaks with the past. For example , the 
inability of the CDU/CSU to obtain a majority o f  the 
Bundestag seats required a coalition in order to rul e .  
Moreover , the wishes and needs o f  the people were different 
at this time than during the Adenauer days . With the rise 
of new leaders came basic policies such as decreasing 
tensions with Eastern Europe. In the sphere of foreign 
affairs with the Eastern European governments , the Bonn 
decision-makers were consistent in the renunciation of the 
Hallstein Doctrine and the increased emphasis on diplomatic 
ties with their Eastern neighbors. The Grand Coalition 
government ,  which lasted only from 1966 to 1969 , did not 
face a great amount of confli cting and challenging problems 
in its foreign affair s .  These favorable circumstances 
helped in maintaining consis tency in policy , or at mos t ,  in 
bringing about a gradual change which did not disturb the 
symmetry of the system. Therefor e ,  the use of the model 
developed in this thesis work works very well for this 
period. 
I I I .  The Brandt-Scheel Era. In comparison to the earlier 
Adenauer government era , the years of 1969 to 1 9 7 2  repre­
sented a vast difference in Ostpolitik . The attitudes and 
ideas of the .west German decision-makers no longer followed 
the old ways of their predecessor s .  While Willy Brandt 
began his career in the Federal government ' s  cabinet under 
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the CDU/CSU dominated Grand Coalition , his accession to the 
chancellorship signaled a fresh start in the Federal 
Republ i c ' s  affairs with Eastern Europe. During the three 
years of the Brandt-Scheel control of the Bundestag , the 
major goal of the government was to further detente w i th 
the East while maintaining close and strong ties with the 
West. Brandt felt that his best negotiating position would 
result from a firm implantment in Western organizations 
such as the Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Fol lowing this guideline , the policies of 
the SPD-FDP coalition government were consistent w i th each 
other. At the same time , the efforts toward reconcili ation 
of Bonn w i th Moscow and Warsaw yielded a more stable bargain­
ing position. With the - renunciation of the use of force 
for territorial changes and the recognition of the Oder­
Neisse line as an international boundary, the Bonn govern­
ment began to invision the goal of recognition as a sincere 
actor in detente. The Federal Republ i c  had not actually 
forfeited any security.  In fact , i t  had gained the respect 
of its bargaining partners. These initial stages of the 
SPD-FDP efforts toward detente were fol lowed closely by 
th e development of peaceful coexistence between Bonn and 
East Berl i n ,  thereby promoting stability in the German 
nation and the security of central Europe. By now, West 
German thoughts of reunification had been discarded as an 
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immediate or even short-range goa l ,  and stability and 
security became the primary objective. The consistency of 
policy in the Brandt-Scheel Era can be shown quite clearly 
by the use of the model approach. In conclusion , the 
analysis of a l l  three eras can i l lustrate the validity and 
applicabi l i ty of the paradigm of the study. 
Probably the most serious limitation on model-building 
is that, in order to i l lustrate a systems analysis spanning 
a long period o f  time the dynamics o f  the system must be 
forfeited and replaced by structure. The elimination of 
the smaller interrelated details of the system often omits 
a small phas e ,  or at least does not completely explain i t .  
This i s  the case with the transitional phases between the 
three eras o f  Ostpoli tik used as an analytical basis for 
this study. Through this systemic approach the transitional 
periods can only be described as vague times of feedback 
which result in a systemic change and new inputs . Since 
the timespan of the inter-era feedback process of the model 
is indefinite and undefined , the modular adaptation of this 
phase of the system is impractical . This leads to the 
exclusion of. potenti ally important data. The use of this 
systems analysis ( model-bui lding ) as a conceptual approach 
w i l l  not,  in itsel f ,  provide a complete understanding o f  
Ostpolitik.  A researcher , when reading and studying the 
i l lustrations of CHAPTER I V ,  might be inclined to view the 
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input-output rel ationship as being caus a l ;  that i s ,  that 
inputs are direct causes of their laterally corresponding 
outputs.  This i s  not the case ; there is a relationship, 
but the type and extent varies continuously in a dynamic 
system. 
A question might arise as to whether the period of 
1949 to 1 9 7 2  was one of systemic change or one of a contin­
ous system. Depending on ones interpretation of the data,  
one or the other conclusion might be reached. If a systems 
approach is taken l i terally and in a macro sense as Easton 
often does , them one continuous system would provide the 
best answer .  I f ,  on the other hand , the researcher views 
the breaks with tradition as being distinct and substantial , 
then a systemic change would be the answer. There is no 
doubt concern�ng the difference : between the Adenauer CDU/CSU 
government and the Brandt-Scheel SPD-FDP government ,  but 
the similarities between the latter and the Grand Coali tion 
government are much greater. Conceivably , the l atter two 
eras of I l lustration XI could be parts of the same system. 
The major cause of a systemic chang e ,  if one had to be 
determined according to the material of this study, would 
have to be the status of Germany. There are three different 
atti tudes represented in the three eras , closely paralleling 
the chronological divisions , which faci l i tate systemic 
change: the Adenauer government ( and that of his 
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predecessor) relied on a policy of strength to deal w i th 
Eastern Europe ; the Grand Coali tion government abandoned 
the theory of "blackmai l "  to gain support for their cau s e ;  
the Brandt-Scheel government approached the East with more 
of an atti tude of mutual respect. Again , the status of 
Germany is an important factor in supporting the interpre­
tation of three separate systems. These attitudinal differ­
ences are represented in the policy changes which accompanied 
each governmental change . With the defeat of the CDU/CSU 
majority in 1966 , new attitudes were displayed by the 
electorate , r�sulting in new ideas in the deci sion-making 
arena. The SPD voice in the Federal Cabinet was heard. 
The accession of Brandt to the chancellorship brought even 
more new ideas into the government .  
This study has shown , fairly substantially,  the 
utility of the systems approach. It has shown that the 
material of Ostpoli tik can be placed in the paradigm with 
little contradiction. As I l lustration XI demonstrates , 
the adaptation of the paradigm, when f i lled with the 
components o f  Ostpoli tik , can provide a picture of the 
systems of the three eras . The inclusion of the l i terature 
in a model has served to simplify an observation of 
Ostpo l i tik into a relationship of . inputs and outputs.  
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Reflections on Realism 
The limitations and questions raised by tne use of 
the systemic approach can be aided by the approach of the 
second theorist used in this study, Hans J .  Morgenthau. 
Morgenthau fol lows a basic theory of realism, or national 
self-interest in his power or balance of power approach. 
The benefi.t of the historical approach is that the re­
searcher can view the subject in a vast amount of detail 
if he so desires . Unlike a systems approach, the historical 
approach to realism does not omit data in order to fit i t  
into a model . According to the realist approach , the 
objectives of a state fol low the guidelines of national 
self-interest. In this view the principal objectives of 
a country and its governments would change only rarely. 
In the case of West German foreign policy toward its 
Eastern neighbors i ts path has led to probably two important 
changes in its objectives . The first major shi f t  was that 
the decis ion-makers switched from an emphasis on reunif i.­
cation to an emphasis on normalization. From the standpoint 
of realism, the principal objective of the Adenauer Era was 
reunification, because the iQea of being a diviped German 
nation was unnatura l .  At the end .of the Second World War 
the German people were the only European nation who were 
forced to accept the existence of two states,  each with its 
own governmental and economic system. There were other 
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Europeans who , due to their geographic location, were sub­
j ected to new governmental controls ( such as the case with 
the Westward boundary shifts of Poland ) ,  but the division 
of the German nation was a condition which had not existed 
since 1 8 7 1  and the formation of the German Empire. 
The second major shi f t  which has changed the course 
of West German Ostpoli tik has been the alteration of the 
instrumentation for normali zation from passive confrontation 
to active cooperation. This change has led to greater 
detente in Europe , but detente does not mean an abandonment 
of Western ties . During the Grand Coalition Era the Federal 
government no longer emphasi zed reunification and shifted 
to norma lization, but the methods of promoting this new 
direction were s t i l l  very cautiou s ,  i f  not s l ightly mistrust­
ful of the communists in Eastern Europe. In the Brandt­
Scheel government the decis ion-maker.s promoted a new 
policy o f  passive cooper ation and reconcili ation with the 
E as t ,  while maintaining the firm ties with the Wes t ;  
Ostpo l i tik and Westpo l i tik , its counterpar t ,  were genuinely 
connected. 
Realistically,  the objectives , , both short- term and 
long- term, must be viewed as what were thought to be the 
best policies for the national self- interest ( in thi� ·case 
the West German people and, secondar i ly , a11 · Germans ) .  The 
major steps which were taken, such as the Moscow Treaty on 
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through the Basic Treaty, were viewed as establi shing a 
modus vivendi for Germany. These shifts were not substan­
tive so much as they were procedural , but they did lay the 
foundation for future negotiations which would benef i t  the 
German people . 
The idea of realism, although i t  is a subjective 
term, is easy to note in international relations . Even 
though most decision-makers do not conciously realize they 
are using this approach, most probably could be placed in 
its category more times than not. Adenauer acted . on what 
could be conceived as realistic grounds according to the 
times when he confronted communism with active economic 
force--the idea was openly to oppose communism through 
overt p�litical and economic competition . In essence , he 
sought to deny the legitimacy of the East German regime. 
His po licies could easily have been successful had it not 
been for such countermeasures as the Berlin Wal l .  Refugees 
were fleeing to West Germany from the East continuously 
prior to 1961 and the erection of the wa l l .  I n  their own 
times , both Kiesinger and Brandt were representative of the 
prevailing atti tudes also . 
Realism prevailed in West German foreign policy with 
Eastern Europe from 1949 to 1 9 7 2 .  · From the study of the 
li terature included in this study there appears to have 
been no major initia tions under any of the three eras which 
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could be labeled "unrealistic" in their own time frames. 
This must be the case if realism is taken as being pol icies 
set forth with the national self- interest as the major 
objective ( nati9nal sel£-interest including such i deas as 
security, prestige, relative peace, and preservation ) .  In 
a l l  three eras the policy developments have led to this 
objective. In the case of the Wes t German government ,  the 
belief among the decision-makers was that their policies 
promoted the interests of all Germans . More specifically,  
any doubt of the promo tion of the interests of a l l  Germans 
would currently be raised against the Brandt government 
than against those of his predecessor s .  His government ' s  
policies should not be considered unreal i s ti c  for a l l  
Germans . His governmental policies have sacrificed 
reuni fi cation as a short-term objective , but through 
increased cooperation and communication East and West 
Germans w i l l  be drawn closer together . In a sense this 
wi l l  eventually lead to a de facto reunification of the 
German nation. This could in turn lead to an elimination 
of differences between the governments of the two po l i tical 
entities of Germany. 
Through the overview of Ostpo l i tik in CHAPTER I I I  
and the preceding comments , i t  i s . evident that the approaches 
of Easton and Mprgenthau , when taken together, can provide 
a useful method of studying this subject. The systems 
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analys i s ,  which simpli fies , generali zes , and cat�gorizes , 
when supplemented by an historical overview and a realist 
approach , can serve to answer many questions involved in 
Ostpolitik. 
Final Remarks 
The use of realism in the study of Ostpolitik not 
only helps to understand the development of past events , 
but i t  can also serve as a good basis for subjectively 
projecting future policy development .  The Federal Republic 
of Germany is �n a central focal pos ition in Europe, and 
has been front runner in new relations s ince the accession 
of Brandt to the chancellorship in 196 9 .  I f  the feedback 
proces s ,  or the promotion of realism, can be applied to the 
post- 1 9 7 2  era , the comp0nents which would influence a 
systemic change would follow a course from detente and 
normalization to open cooperation and integration. From 
having studied the developing trends of Ostpo l itik since 
the Adenguer days , it is evident that a world-wide detente 
is increasing between the major powers of the world. This 
does not mean a break down of nationalism and a trend toward 
�nternationalism, but i t  does lead to a belief in common 
causes ; this commona l i ty i s  the source of the relaxation 
of tensions in the northern hemisphere. With the Soviet 
Union and the United States having the capabi li ties of a 
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multiple overk i l l ,  the threat .of nuclear confrontation i s  
decreasing. W ith the increased numbers of areas of coopera-
tion , the necessity for strong alignments of nations will 
eventually decrease. The need for strong po�kets of 
strength in Europe can already be seen as declining; the 
NATO tro.op strength has annu ally decreased for the past few 
year s .  The need for continuation of organiza�ions such as 
NATO at its present level has been questioned by some 
members . This all leads back to the plight of the Federal 
' 
Republ i c.  
Each state , including the Federal Republi c ,  tries to 
influence other states ; this i s  a reali stic approach. The 
major areas of influence today lie in the realm o f  economi cs . 
The livelihood of both the state and �ts people are the 
maj o r  concern. I t  is for this reason that militarism i s  
declining in Western Europe. Through the Common Market ,  
West Germany has learned to influence other countries 
through its economic capabi l ities.  Thi s ,  when coupled with 
po li tical developments throughout Europe, has led to a 
relaxation of tensions and increased cooperations . The 
need for a livelihood has al tered the personali ties of the 
West German Decision-Making Arena. �imultaneously the same 
process has takert place in Eas terri Europe. With this trend, 
again of commonal ities , differences will be overcome by 
mutual needs which will result in increased similarities 
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between states and their citi zens . 
In a specific look toward the future developments of 
West German Ostpo l i tik the trend appears to be ' for additional 
formal treaties with more Eastern European states , leading 
to mutual territorial recognition and renunciation of force 
and, more importantly, increased economic and social 
cooperation among states with different ideologies. Terri-
torial boundaries will not cease to exist in the forseeable 
future, but the differences w i thin their walls will decrease. 
The Federal Republic has not been alone ip its struggle of 
Ostpol itik ; there has been an equal Wes tpo l itik from the 
Eastern Europeans . This has to be the case or Ostpo l i tik 
would have been a voi d .  
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DIARY OF EVENTS 
2 3  May 1949 
Basic Law comes into force 
14 August 1949 
Elections of the first federal Republic Bundestag in Bonn 
1 2  September 1949 
Theodor Heuss becomes first Federal President 
15 September 1949 
Konrad Adenauer becomes first Federal Chancellor 
3 1  October 1949 
Federal Republis j oins OEEC 
18 April 1951 
Federal Republi c ,  France,  Italy , and the Benelux countries 
sign the treaty forming the European Coal and Steel 
community 
5 May 1951 
Federal Republic becomes member of the Council of Europe 
1 7  June 1 9 5 3  
Popular uprising i n  East Berlin and the German Democratic 
Republic. Soviet troops sent to put it down 
6 September 1953 
Elections of the second legislative period of the Bundes­
tag. Konrad Adenauer becomes Federal Chancellor for the 
second time 
17 July 1954 
Theodor Heuss elected for second term as President 
9 May 19�5 
Federal Republ ic becomes member of Nato 
14 September 1955 
Adenauer visits Moscow. Federal Republic commences 
. _ diplomatic. relations wi.tb USSR 
1 January 1957 
Saarland incorporated in the Federal Republi c  as a Federal 
state 
25 March 1957 
Signing of the Treaties of Rome marks the commencement of 
the European Economic Community and Euratom 
1 5  September 1957 
Elections of the third legi � l ative period of the Bund estag. 
Konrad Adenauer ' s  third term as "Bundeskanzler" 
1 July 1959 . 
Heinrich Lubke becomes second Federal President 
13 August 1961 
Berlin Wall built by GDR authorities to prevent the flood 
of refugees to the West 
17 September 1961 
Electi9ns of the fourth legislative period of the Bundes­
tag. Konrad Adenauer becomes Chancellor for fourth session 
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22 January 1963 
Konrad Adenauer and Charles DeGaulle countersign the 
Franco-West German Friendship Treaty 
11 October 1963 
Adenauer steps down 
16 October 1 9 6 3  
Ludwig Erhard becomes second Federal Chancellor 
1 July 1964 
Heinrich Llibke re-elected Federal President 
5 May 1965 
Diplomatic relations with Israel begin 
19 September 1965 
Elections of  the fi fth legislative period of the Bundestag. 
Ludwig Erhard re-elected Chancellor 
30 November 1966 
Ludwig Erhard resigns 
1 December 1966 
Kurt Georg Kies inger takes over as Chancel lor. Grand 
Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD formed with Willy Brandt 
as Foreign Minister 
19 April 1967 
· 
Konrad Adenauer dies at age of 91 
5 March 1969 
Gustav Heinemann becomes third President of Federal 
Republic 
26 S eptember 1969 
General elections held for si xth session of the Bundes tag. 
Wi l ly Brandt becomes Chancellor. SPD-FDP c�alition formed 
with Walter Scheel as Foreign Minister 
1 2  August 1 9 70 
West German treaty with Soviet Union signed in Moscow 
7 December 1970 
West German treaty with Poland signed in Warsaw 
3 September 1 9 7 1  
Four-Power Agreement on Berlin signed 
2 7  April 1 9 7 2  
Vote of no-confidence in Chancellor Brandt lodged i n  Bundes­
tag by Opposition CDU/CSU defeated 
2 2  September 1 9 7 2  
Premature dissolution o f  the Bundestag 
11 October 1 9 7 2  
Beginning o f  diplomati� relat�ons with People ' s  Republic 
of China · 
1 9  November 1 9 7 2  
Elections of  the seventh session of the Bundes�ag . W i l ly 
Brandt re-elected as Federal Chancellor 
21 December 1 9 7 2  
Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic and German Demo­
cratic Republi c  signed 
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1 January 1 9 7 3  
Treaties o f  accession to European Community signed by 
Bri tain , Denmark, and Eire. Common Market now comprises 
nine countries 
3 July 1 9 7 3  
European Security Conference opens i n  Hels inki 
18 September 1 9 7 3  
Federal Republic and GDR enter the United Nations 
6 May 1974 
W�lly Brandt resignes as Chancellor 
15 May 1974 
Walter Scheel becomes President 
16 May 1974 
Helmut Schmidt becomes Chancellor 
Source: The German Tribune , (May 2 3 ,  1 9 74 ) , p.  24. 
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THE MOSCOW AND WARSAW TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Fol lowing is a sta tement by German Foreign Minister 
Walter Scheel to the Bundestag in Bonn, delivered on 
February 2 3 ,  1 9 7 2  ( excerpts--official translation ) :  
"The general world situation which forms the po litical 
background for the submission of the treaties of Moscow 
and Warsaw is grave. We all know that the Second World War 
left behind problems which are incomparably more. dangerous 
than those which led to previous conflicts.  
" In Europe, East and West face each other , heavily 
armed in their respective mili tary a l l i ances . The line of 
confrontation runs right through our country dividing i t  
against the will o f  the Germans . 
"Today the Federal Republic and the GDR are more 
sealed off from each other than they are from any other 
country in the world. And now the ' delimitation ' policy 
propagated by the GDR leadership is intended to perfect 
what the war and barbed-wire, mistrust and ideological 
enmity have fail ed fully to achieve. 
"The nuclear confrontation of the world powers , which 
now include China , calls into question the very existence 
of mankind , more so than at any other time in history. 
"This explains why the American President is now in 
Peking paying l i ttle attention to any objections · against · 
such a journey on protocol or legal istic grounds . He intends 
to leave nothing untried in another attempt to substitute 
reason for hos t i l i ty and economic cooperation for the arms 
race before i t  i s  too late.  And i t  is for this same reason 
that he will also be visiting Moscow. 
"This Federal Government , like others before i t ,  would 
have been showing the most criminal disregard for the welfare 
of this nation if it had not attempted to help ease tensions. 
I t  realizes that in our present s i tuation it is not merely 
a question of unresolved frontier problems. Indeed , the 
physical and biological survival of our nation i s  at stake. 
"The quadripartite agreement on Berlin was the touch­
stone--and not only for us--to show whether the Soviet Union 
would be prepared not only to talk detente but to enter into 
an agreement on i t  on the basis of a· justifiable compromi se. 
This is why the United States President said that this 
regulation had been a milestone , that i t  had been a passport 
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to Moscow for him. The readiness for compromise shown by 
Moscow gives rise to hopes for arrangements to materialize 
in other fields as wel l .  
"The nucleus o f  our East-West policy, i . e .  the 
relationship between the two states in Germany, i s  
influenced by these treaties : 
"Let me now comment on the contents of the trea ties : 
1 .  
"Both treaties contain comprehensive provisions for 
abstention from the use of force , precluding not only the 
use of force but even the threat to use force. This pre­
clusion applies to a l l  aspects of the mutual relations 
between the contracting parti es . It means that all questions 
at issue will have to be solved exclusively by peaceful 
means . 
"What i s  the practical significance of this renunci­
ation of force? The Soviet Union can no longer invoke an 
a l leged right of intervention under Articles 53 and 107 of 
the United Nations Charter , which in 1969 i t  was still able 
to do . This fact was explicitly confirmed by the Soviet 
Foreign Minister. 
2 .  
"Both treaties contain a statement about the frontiers. 
They establish no legal basis for existing frontiers and 
contain no comments on the emergence of those fronti ers.  
But they contain pledges. In the German- Soviet treaty the 
parties pledge to respect the frontiers as inviolable. 
This means that they cannot be changed by force. But i t  
does not preclude any peacefu l ,  agreed change in the 
frontiers. The Soviet Foreign Minister has expl icitly 
confirmed thi s .  
"Furthermore , in the German- Soviet treaty both sides 
have declared that they have no territorial claims. That 
is in keeping with the policy we have always pursued. The 
Federal Republic has never in the past asserted any 
territorial claims • • • •  
"A policy aiming for a state of peace in Europe in 
which the German people will recover i ts unity in free 
self-determination does not violate this provision of the 
treaty; this follows from the Letter on German Unity which 
I addressed to the Soviet Foreign Minister when signing 
the Moscow treaty. The Letter was accepted by the Soviets 
without contradiction. 
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" In the German-Polish treaty , the statement on the 
frontiers has been set out in more concrete terms. It has 
been made clear that the Federal Republic no longer calls 
the Oder-Neisse-Line in question as Poland ' s  Western 
frontier. This means that the regions beyond that frontier 
must be regarded and respected by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for the duration of its existence , as Polish 
territory in spite of the fact that a peace treaty for 
Germany has not yet been concluded and the rights and 
responsibi l i ties o f  the Four Powers continue to exist for 
G ermany as a who l e .  
"This frontier settlement has nothing to d o  with the 
individual rights of the Germans who live in the territories 
beyond the Oder and the Neisse. Those rights were not the 
subject of the treaties . To make this point clear I stated 
formally during the negotiations that the treaty does not 
deprive anyone of the rights due to him under the laws o f  
the Federal Republic. 
"On the other hand , the German-Pol ish treaty does not 
create any right of option for the Germans beyond the Oder 
and the Neisse , but as our relations with Poland improve i t  
w i l l  open up to u s  the possibility of using our influence 
on their behalf . 
3 .  
"Both treaties contain a provision which clearly states 
that treaties previously concluded by the contracting 
parties will not be affected. This includes , as the other 
contracting parties know, the convention on relations 
between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany 
in which the signatory states state their agreement ' that 
an essential aim of their common policy is a freely negoti­
ated peace settlement for the whole of Germany . . •  ' and that 
' the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must 
await such a settlemen t . ' Thus i t  is clear that the 
Federal Republi c  can speak only for i tself , but not for an 
all-German sovereign. It i s  also assured that the rights 
of the Four Powers with regard to Germany as a"wl'role remain 
unaffected. 
4 .  
" F inally both treaties set out the normalization 
of relations as . an aim of the contracting parties and 
intended to cover a l l  areas of mutual relations . I t  i s  
the fundamental po l i tical objective o f  the treaties which 
points to the future. The rights and obligations arising 
out of the treaties are formulated in unequivocal terms. 
They give no cause for disagreement between the contracting 
parties . 
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" International treaties must in principle be in­
preted from their texts . Their interpretation cannot go 
beyond what has been agreed between the contracting parti e s .  
"The obligations with regard t o  respecting the 
frontiers are also unequivoca l .  
" Detente and normal i zation are the pillars o f  the 
political process in Europe, which is carried on by both 
sides with the objective 0£ ensuring greater security in 
Europe. 
"Even in view of those questions which today are 
insoluble and which are called the German problem, detente 
and cooperation between East and Wes t in Europe are indeed 
possible ,  i . e . through mutual , contractually agreed 
abstention from force on the bas:is of the status quo. 
Without such a renunci ation , without a clear and unreserved 
statement on the status quo , there will be neither detente 
nor cooperation with the East European countries . This is 
the basis on which everybody will have to proceed who wants 
to achieve better relations with the peoples of Eastern 
--Europe.  
"President Nixon in his message to Congress on 
February 9 said : ' The Four Powers reached an agreement on 
Berl in , designed to end the perenni a l  postwar crises over 
the City and to improve the situation of the brave people 
of West Berlin in concrete ways . The prospect arose , for 
the first time , of concrete discussions with the East on 
other unresolved issues of security and cooper ation in 
a l l  of Europe. • 
" I  said earlier that but for the renunciation of 
force and acceptance of the reality there would have been 
no Berlin agreement. And even the fiercest cri tic of this 
Government will have to admit that while i t  conducted its 
negotiations in Moscow it was the concern for Berlin ' s  
viability that determined its steps . 
"None of the members of the delegation conducting 
the negotiations at the time will ever forget how during 
the last night of the negoti ations , before the initial ling 
of the treaty, the inner tension of a l l  participants was 
heightened to the extreme as I kept reiterating to my 
Soviet colleague that the treaty could not be con€luded 
without a satisf actory Berlin settlement. 
" I  read out to Mr. Gromyko the Cabinet decision of 
July 2 3 ,  1970 word by word: ' The framework for the 
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negotiations is set by the mandate of the Basic Law to 
preserve the unity of the German nations , by the rights 
and respons ibilities of the Three Powers with regard to 
Germany as a whole and Berl i n ;  and by the international 
obligations incurred by the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The Federal Government considers that any progress in the 
sphere of European detente i s  inseparably linked with 
progress towards a satisfactory settlement of the situation 
in and around Ber l i n .  Only after relevant arrangements 
have been made can a treaty on the renunciation of the use 
of force be put into effect . ' 
"The policy which has led to the treaties has con­
tributed subs tantially to the cohesion of Western Europe 
as i t  i s  taking shape. Those were no empty words when we 
said before the negotiations that our entire policy towards 
Eastern Europe was based on the progressive integration of 
Western Europe. In other matters there may be sl ight 
inconsistencies and differences of opinion among the 
Europeans , but as regards our policy towards Eastern Europe 
there are none. Less than two weeks ago , on the 1 1 th of 
this month, President Pompidou said in Pari s :  ' As regards 
relations with the Eas t ,  we found complete agreement between 
the policy of the Federal Republi c  and that of France. I 
had an opportuni�y of confirming once again to the Federal 
Chancellor our unqu alified support for his policy in this 
fi e ld . ' And on February 13 the British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home stated that the British Government 
had from the very beginning fully supported the Ostpo l i t i k ,  
and welcomed the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw as important 
contributions to relations between East and West. 
"Our Ostpo l i tik has overcome the stagnation. The 
Europeans have rallied to f ind out where they stand . They 
have come to identical conclusiqns . This , in turn, provided 
the beginnings of a common policy for the future. 
"Nobody in this world , including the Soviet Union, 
ignores this fact , and that is what matters. It is not,  
after a l l ,  a question of the formal recognition of the 
European Communities--in fact the legal experts in the 
European Commission in Brussels told us only last week that 
there was no such thing--but of the dynamic process of the 
Eurpean economic and political integration being regarded 
as an unalterable fact and of the · right conclusions being 
drawn from i t  for d e tente an d cooperation. 
"During the negotiations in Moscow and in all the 
talks I have had with Soviet political leaders since then 
I have pointed out that this development also i s  a part of 
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the European reality. Allow me to quote a passage from the 
memorandum on my talks in Moscow on November 28/29 , 19 7 1 :  
' The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs drew attention to 
the decisive importance of the Community in world trade. 
He described in detail and with great emphasis the auto­
maticity of integration , with special reference to the · 
beginning of the transitional phase of the Communities on 
January 1 ,  19 7 3 .  He also stressed the importance of the 
European Communities as a factor in European security and 
cooperation . The Foreign Minister declared unequivocally 
tha� there was absolutely no question of our changing our 
po licy towards the EEC . ' 
"Nor have I ever left any doubt that these treaties 
are possible only on the basis of the existing balance of 
mi litary power in Europe. 
"There is one assertion , however, which the Federal 
Government cannot let go wi thout contradicting it with 
every emphasis . 
"Nei ther in the treaties nor in the attending documents 
i s  there any clue for the indeed grossly negligent contention 
that these treatj es establish claims for reparations to be 
paid by the Federal Republic o f  Germany. 
" Is the Opposition not impressed by the fact that all 
our a l lies give our policy their united support? The argu­
ments of the Opposition are so essentially lacking in 
plausibi lity because there i s  no useful and practicable 
alternative to back them up . 
" In an interview printed in ' Die Welt , ' Mr . Maurice 
Schumann , my French colleague , was asked what the situation 
might be like in case the ratification was rej ected. He 
replied that he refused even to consider the possibi l i ty 
of i t .  
"The result o f  those long drawn- out and complicated 
negotiations now lies before us . Never before in the history 
of modern diplomacy has there been so close a coordination , 
such close cooperation among all ied states as was the case 
between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic 
during those negotiations . We owe , and this House owes,  
grati tude to the three Western Allies for th� solidarity 
they have shown , and for the unusual efforts they undertook 
in connection with the negotiation s .  
"Fairness commands us also to recognize the readiness 
of the Soviet Union and Poland to contribute to a favorable 
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conclusion of the· negotiations in spite of all difficulties 
and all tenac ity. 
"And , f i nally , we should not forget that it also needed 
the cooperation of the GDR to arrive at the result now before 
us . 
"The Berlin regulation opens up and safeguards the 
routes from the Federal Republi c  to Berlin and from Berlin 
to the Federal Republi c .  It opens a door for Berliners to 
v i s i t  the GDR. I t  expresses recognition of Berlin ' s  ties 
with the Federal Republi c .  It .strengthens Berlin ' s  inter­
national position and i ts representation by the Federal 
Republi c  and confirms Four-Power respons ibi lity. This means 
that a highly sens i t i ve ,  crisis prone problem has been 
brought under contractual control . 
"At the negotiating session on July 3 0 ,  1970 , in the 
fir st  stage of talk s ,  I stated : ' There must be absolute 
clarity i f  the treaty i s  to become the bas�s for better 
and, i t  is to be hoped, ultimately friendly relations between 
our two countries . I therefore repea t :  The unity of the 
Germans remains a po li tical aim no Federal Government ,  
whatever i ts composi�ion, can ever give up. I say this to 
make clear that a peaceful policy based on these principles-­
renunciation of force , respect for territorial integrity, 
nonviolation of frontiers--and serving the unity of the 
Germans within the framework of a European peace system does 
not constitute a violation of the treaty. 
' I  wish to point out once more that we have agreed to 
the border between the FRG and the GDR being mentioned ' in 
de t a il in the article relating to respect for territorial 
integr i t y .  What we cannot renounce, however , is the right 
of the Government and the people to strive to restore by 
peaceful means theit · national unity within the framework 
of a European peace system and on the basis of free self­
dtermination. To make a people renounce its identity w i l l  
serve nobody i n  Europe . That i s  why we have noted with 
great satisfaction your statement on the right of nations 
and states to unite in peace . ' 
"Th i s  resulted in  the Letter on German Unity whi ch , 
together with some other papers ,  i s  part o f  the rati f i cation 
documents • • • 
"The treaties are an essential element of peaceful 
co-exis tence between East and West and of the security in 
Europe. With them , the Federal Republ ic of Germany not 
only want& to improve its own s i tuation, nor only that of 
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Ber l i n .  We regard them as an important contribution to 
stability in this continent. The treaties are a means of 
achieving what the Europeans hope for: mitigation of the 
division of the old world through peaceful exchanges and 
cooperation. 
"Today , the treaties are already so much a part of 
our Allies ' foreign policies that the poli tical effects of 
their being rej ected would be simply incalculable. The 
poss�bili tes for detente in the East wou·ld be blocked for 
a long time to come. Our Allies in the West would feel the 
rej ection to be a torpedo against thei� own detente policy. 
We Germans would have dropped the curtains in Europe just 
as the first light began to dawn. 
"The Soviet world power is like us bound up with the 
fatal mechanism of the nuclear threat and deterrent.  For 
this reason , and first and foremost for this reason , it i s  
interested in eliminating the permanent source of crises 
in Central Europe ; it is our chance that this is s o .  Only 
on this realistic basis can we arrive at any agreement at 
a l l  with the Soviet Union. 
"The Federal Government has a Far East pol icy , though 
i t  w i l l  perhaps differ somewhat from that of 1964.  We 
realize that Asian affairs have to be approached wi th 
caution. We also realize that today . i t i s  no longer a 
question of gradually developing existing good trade re­
lations qn the basis of private agreements but that i t  i s  
now a matter of diplomatic relation s .  
" I  can assure you that the Federal Government will do 
the right thing at the right time . 
"We wish to put into practice that conviction which 
we as men of a very particular generation have learned as 
the lesson of the madness of the Second World War : the 
conviction that frontier s ,  territorial clai�s , the use of 
force and war have, for u s ,  lost me�ning for a l l  time . 
"These treaties should and w i l l  'be the precondition 
and the basis for detente , cooperation and peace in Europe . 
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THE EASTERN TREATIES AND WESTERN SECURITY 
Following i s  a statement by Federal Defense Minister 
Helmut Schmidt during the Bundestag deb�te on the Moscow 
and Warsaw treaties February 24 ( excerpts--unofficial 
translation ) :  
I t  seems to me that i t  has become necessary for all 
parties concerned to explain their own motives to the 
public. I would like to participate in this process , 
referring to the security o f  Berl i n ,  the security of the 
Federal Republi c  of Germany and the security of Europe. 
All these aspects of security , I am convinced , w i l l  be 
s trengthened by the ratification of the treaties . 
Adopting the Harmel Repor t ,  the Atlantic Pact set 
the signals for a new pha se of development wi thin the 
Alli ance. A second basic element of detente was added to 
the first principle of defense. As of that date- - twenty 
years after the Second World War-- the security gained by 
common defense efforts was to be a platform for an attempt 
at an understand ing w i th Efis tern Europe--detente and 
rapprochement on the basis of balance and w i thout security 
risk for the parties concerned. This was the framework 
which the current Federal Government found when assuming 
the responsibility of office in 1969 . 
Now let me recall some facts concerning the process 
we are currently witnessing. 
1 .  
To the United States , the Soviet Union and our neigh­
bors in East and Wes t ,  the problems arising out of the 
continued division of Germany are a primary reason o f  concern 
about peace in Europe . The problems are on the one hand 
the outcome of the war to which Hitler made a total commit­
ment and which he totally los t ;  on the other hand they 
are a result o f  the confrontation between the victorious 
powers which developed after 1 9 4 5 .  
2 .  
We i n  Germany , however , must also face up to another 
real i zation . Germany ' s  neighbors in East and West are 
much more inclined to tolerate the division of Germany 
' than to accept that the part of Germany tied to them by 
virtue of an al liance , should cross over into the sphere 
o f  the other pact . My colleague von Weizsaecker has spoken 
of these problems. Our neighbors do not consider the 
present state of affairs norma l .  They possibly regard i t  
a s  a threat to peace and to their security. But a united 
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Germany , and above a l l  the process of reuniting Germany , 
seems even more dangerous to our neighbors , because i t  
could j eopardize the balance of power in Europe and thus 
endanger peace. Allow me to cite Dr . Kiesinger ' s  word 
about ( state o f )  critical size and critical impact. 
3 .  
Many of our neighbors nevertheless sense the h i s torical 
abnormity of the division of Germany and even more of the 
division of Europe. Some of them would probably be ready 
to work for a unificatDn of Europe and thus of Germany i f  
· they had a guarantee that the process leading to this end 
could be kept under control and that its inherent risks 
could be checked and calculated. 
4 .  
The Federal Republi c  of Germany has taken a long time 
to realize that the two parts of the nation can get together 
again only i f  Europ e ,  too , grows together. For many in 
our country i t  is s t i l l  difficult to understand that this 
process cannot be effected by the Germans alone ; but that 
Europe can come together only if both super powers , the 
countries of Eastern and Western Europ e ,  and the German 
people in both parts want i t .  In other word s ,  to sum i t  
up , Europe ' s  identity can be restored only i f  Moscow, 
Warsaw and East Berl i n ,  too ,  want i t .  
5 .  
The continuity of the Western defense alliance and 
the solidarity of the European and the North American 
partners have been and w i l l  remain the basis of our policy 
within this proces s .  Overemphasis on our security as was 
evinced in some states of postwar poli tics , contributed to 
a paralyzation of the Government in Bonn. Today we know 
that NATO and the EEC have been able in critical times to 
preserve the Western part of Europe free from Soviet 
domination , but that their rigid po l i tical strategy as i t  
was pursued far into the 60 ' s ,  could not serve the unifi­
cation ei ther of Europe or of our country. They w i l l  
hardly be able to do s o  i n  the future, certainly not with­
out initiatives on our par t .  
6 .  
The more we in Bonn move in our foreign policy , the 
more our neighbors in East and West might see reason for 
concern , i f  we were to try and move alone . Thus we w i l l  
not take one i sola ted step at any point in this process. 
This Government was extremely careful that its initiatives 
should be incorporated in the over a l l  plans of our part­
ners in the Alli ance. There is public and documentary 
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proof of this coordinati on--which the Opposition spokesmen 
apparently do not want to see-in a number o f  decisions 
made by the Council of Ministers of the Alliance . Over 
two , three years , the communiques of the Alli ance Council 
of Ministers describe the major elements--and I again quote 
Dr. Kiesinger-- "of the process of overcoming the East-West 
conf l i c t . " Our policy i s  being realized within a framework 
of given possibilities within the overa l l  framework · of 
changing international relation s .  
President Nixon ' s  slogan " from confrontation to 
negotiation" three yeras ago denoted an era encompassing 
the whole world which, at the same time , al lowed our 
country to widen and to use its foreign policy leeway to 
its fullest extent. 
In 196 9 ,  the Federal Government faced the consequences 
o f  a s i tuation which i t  did not create but which had grown 
historically ; i t  proceeded from the state of things as i t  
found i t a t  that time. I n  this endeavor , the principle 
of balance has been and w i l l  remain the supreme guideline 
of our foreign and security policy. It determines the 
Federal Government ' s  posi tion on the North Atlantic Pact� 
towards the great nuclear powers , on the necessary attempt 
to gain security through arms reductions and also our 
approach in the Federal Government ' s  search for understanding 
and rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the peoples of 
Eastern Europe . 
Thrs po l i cy must be based on one premi s e :  Whoever 
pursues a policy under the protection of a balance of power , 
may not attempt to make others break away from that balance. 
For our policy of detente towards the East this means 
concretely : 
1 )  In Eas tern Europe no essential developments can 
take place wi thout the participation of Moscow. This i s  
the s i tuation today. 
2 )  The Governments in Warsaw ,  East Ber l i n ,  Prague 
and other East European capi tals , nevertheless , have 
interests , a w i l l  and impact of their own. 
3 )  Nothing , however , would be more foolish and danger­
our than to try and seek to drive wedges between the states 
of the Warsaw Pact, dangerous not only for us but for peace. 
I t  would be just as foo lish,  and just as hazardous for 
detente and cooperation if somebody were to interpret our 
desire for peaceful coexistence merely as a tactical maneuve� 
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I t  seems to me that the crucial change in the Atlantic 
Pact in 1969 must be seen in the fact that the A l l i ance not 
only announced the principle of defense plus detente but 
also endowed this idea with life , introducing many poli tical 
initiatives on this bas i s .  At the same time , the partners 
agreed in the 11 Study on Defense Problems for the Alliance 
in the Seventies11 to adhere to the mili tary and strategic 
concepts of forward defense and flexible respon s e ,  two 
bas i c  principles which are of special importance to u s .  
Whoever raises the charge that the Federal Government ' s  
po licy of detente and treaties j eopardizes the cohesion of 
the West and the effectiveness of the Alli ance must know, 
that he places himself in opposi tion of all--and I emphasize 
all--Governments of the states in the Western A l l i ance. 
I believe all of u s ,  here and within the Alliance , 
agree that our detente policy i s  to complement our security 
policy but that i t  nei ther can nor its meant to replace our 
defense contribution. Let me just point out that long 
before German- Soviet negotiations were even considered , the 
trend had become apparent which since the mid- f i fties has 
been associated w i th the name of Senator Mansfield. But i t  
i s  a fact that no Amer ican Government has given way to such 
demands . President Nixon ' s  recent foreign policy report to 
the American Congress convincingly confirmed this yet another 
time. 
It is obvious that Europe ' s  consolidation can be very 
signifi cant for our security pol i cy . This i s  all the more 
true as a West European defense identity emerges more and 
more clearly in the Euro-Group in which the European. NATO 
members--without France--have created a temporary forum to 
coordinate and harmonize their defense po licies within the 
framework of the A lliance . This led to the ''Development 
and Improvement Programme" ( EDIP ) and to a Euro White Paper 
( on Defense ) .  Much remains to be done , that is true. But 
one cannot overlook that we have succeeded in developing 
something in Western Europe within the framework of defense 
and detente which nobody could achieve since the EDC 
( European Defense Communi ty ) treaties failed. 
The Eastern treaties have added a new quality to the 
central problems of European security ; the German question. 
They al lowed us to find a settlement which guarantees the 
absence of pressure and violence at the most dangerous 
source of cri sis in the l ast 2 5  years--Berlin. From the 
viewpoint of g l obal securi t y ,  the understanding on the cri sis 
among the Super Powers , the pacification of Berlin by virtue 
of the quadripartige agreement ,  must be named as the primary 
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achievement o f  our Ostpolitik. 
As a second result I should like to mention that the 
a lli ance between the United States and Western Europe today, 
in 197 2 ;  is stronger and specifically much firmer than in 
the spring, summer and fall of 196 6 ,  before we started to 
participate in inf luencing this policy. 
Thirdly , stable elements of integration have emerged 
in Europe. 
Fourthly , the Federal Republic of Germany has won 
more leeway as was necessary in our interes t . .  Its use 
benefits the alliance as a who l e .  It was necessary to gain 
this room because international politics had been set in 
mDtibn: and we had to assume our proper place in this proces& 
Five : The commitment of the United States in Europe 
no longer means the continued fulf i l lment of the obligations 
assumed through Ameri ca ' s  entry into the war and i ts out­
come. Today this engagement i s  motivated by the objective 
of building a stable peace system in Europe. 
S i x :  The balance of power effective i n  Europe and 
affecting Europe from the outside has been stabilized by 
the treaties by the element of agreed-upon renunciation of 
force. On this point we consider the renunciation of force 
on part of the Soviet Union considerably more important than 
the renunciation of force which we declared. 
Seven : The German question has moved closer to a 
solution to the degree that the treaties which we have 
concluded and intend to seek will reduce insecurity in Europe. 
Let me say three sentences on this poi n t .  Nobody 
stands to gain from a peace threatening conflict between 
the two commun ist super powers. To the Contrary: this 
would constitute an unfathomable risk for the whole world. 
And third: The division was becoming deeper--and to some 
even self- evipent--the longer we waited . 
Nobody can predict today how the policy of detente 
w i l l  develop in detai l .  But i t  is crucial that we in 
Germany should orient ourselves along the prerequ i s i te for 
a calmly and realistically pursued policy of detente� The 
first condition i s  that our internal democratic order in the 
Federal Republic remains firmly consolidated so that we · 
retain our impact as a partner in foreign affairs. The 
second condition is that our foreign and our defense policy 
be and remain coordinated with Washington, Pari s ,  London 
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and a l l  our allies.  The third condition i s  that the Alliance 
continue to guarantee j ointly the security of Europe , the 
Federal Republic and of West Berli� while the balance of 
power is maintained in Europe � We can succeed in this only , 
i f  we continue to make the necessary contributiqns on our 
part. Detente does not render defense and soldiers sense­
less , but rather presumes them. 
A conference on security and cooperation could be 
reasonable i f  the issues were really to be negoti atied which 
its title denotes.  The necessary trust can arise on ly , if 
East and West reach a harmonious understanding on the j 
situation in Europe arrl agree on common principles on which 
European security i s  to be based. 
Consequently such a conference , which will become 
possible through the enactment of the treaties and the 
Four-Power Berlin agreement ,  will have to deal with the 
po l i tical principles as a platform for force reduction s .  
Only such a n  understanding w i l l  allow us to develop rules 
for cooperation between East and West in Europe. 
Let me assure you--the German- Soviet treaty and the 
German-Polish treaty in no way change the po litica l ,  legal , 
mili tary or economic basis of our security. They eliminate 
uncertainty and suspicion ; they reduce the threat of crises. 
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF USEFUL SOURCES 
The evidence of the importance of Ostpo l itik in world 
affairs is very revealing and plentifu l .  This policy o f  the 
Federal Republic has attracted the attenti0n of many scholars 
in the postwar years , especi a l ly since the change of govern­
ments in 1 969.  The study and reporting of this phenomenon 
has undertaken many diverse roles and in doing so i t  has 
informed the world in many ways of i t . .  But ,  as is the case 
with any subject of discussion,  there are many divergent 
views on a correct approach. There are a number of authors 
who write about Ostpo l i t i k ,  but in contemporary terms only . 
Characteristic of this are journalistic works which do not 
deal in depth w i th the factors involved. Two examples are 
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press and The Bulletin , 
the latter being an official publication of the government 
of the Federal Republic. This type of source gives the 
detai ls needed on a weekly basis for the analysis of 
Ostpo l i tik , but i t  appears to be rather superficial at 
times . Others in this category might be Dulles ' work with 
Germany ( Eleanor Lansing Dulles , One Germany .2.!:. Two? , 
New York, 1968 ) ,  which is very tradi tional , and James H.  
Wolfe ' s  "West Germany and Czechoslovak i a "  ( "West Germany 
and Czechoslovaki a :  The Struggle for Reconci l i a tion , "  
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Orbi s ,  XIV , Spring 1 9 70 ) .  These are not the only works , 
however, which lack certain aspects of total effectivenes s .  
There are some authors who display a predominantly 
historical viewpoi n t .  Hans Kohn treats world affairs from 
a historical outlook. In one of his works ( " Germany in 
World P olitics , "  Current His tory, XLIV, Apr i l  1 9 6 3 ) his 
lack of analysis is evident. E . H . Albert does a very good 
job o f discussing W illy Brandt ' s  foreign policy in a descrip­
tive method ( " The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany , "  
Internati onal Affair s ,  XLVI , Apri l  1 9 70 ) .  These scholars 
are accompanied by , among other s ,  Wi l l ard R. Fann ( " Germany 
and East Europe: Problems of Detente , "  Current Hi story ,  
LIV , May 1968 ) i n  their lack of analytical projection i n  
their efforts of description o f  Ostpolitik.  
There are some authors , however, who , to varying 
extents , capture an overall view of West German ' s  Eastern 
policy. Notable among this is Lawrence L. Whetten 
( "Appraising the Ostpo l i tik , " Orbi s ,  XV, F a l l  1 9 7 1 ) ,  who , 
as a noted student o f  German foreign po licy,  has successfully 
combined description and analy s i s .  Two other prominent 
authors whom I would categori z e  with Whetten are Wolfram 
F .  Henrieder ( "West· German Foreign Policy : B ackground to 
Current Issues , "  Orbi s ,  XII I ,  Winter 1 9 70 ) ,  and Josef Korbel 
( "West Germany ' s  Ostpolitik:  I and II , "  Orbi s ,  XIII and XIV, 
Winter and Summer 1 9 70 ) .  These authors have attempted 
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to describe the complete scene of Ostpo l i t i k ,  though they 
fa l l  short of providing a complete understanding of i t .  
The li terature o f  Ostpoli tik encompasses a broad 
spectrum of primary and secondary sources. The amount of 
material is very well represented in the wide range o f  
publications available for a project of this nature. P laced 
in a perspective of viewpoints , the li terature ranges from 
Soviet to American and includes many opinions between the 
two . Certain volumes of Current History are particularly 
helpful with articles by scholars of various nation a lities . 
The viewpoint of the vast majority o f  authors in this 
periodical are pro-West Germany and utilize a rather strict 
historical outline . They do not attempt to analyze the 
causes and effects of the developments they discuss but 
their primarily Western European backgrounds serve to enhance 
this point of view. On the other hand , Orbis ( an American 
publication ) include such scholars as Elmer P li schke , 
Wolfram F .  Hanrieder , and Josef Korbe l ,  all three noted 
internationally in their f i e ld of speci alty ,  West German 
foreign affairs. Including these authors , Orbis presents 
a well rounded view of Western approaches to the study of 
Ostpolitik. West German foreign policy i s  well represented 
in this publ ication of European affair s .  
Agai n ,  both The World Today and International Affairs 
( London) provide a European view of Ostpo l i t i k ,  al though 
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The World_ ,Today i·s more independently oriented to po li tical 
science than is International Affairs. Both of these 
periodicals , however , are sl ightly more oriented toward 
analysis than the majority of those authors of Current 
His tory and Orbi s .  None o f  these volume s ,  however, 
deliberately state their contributors '  techniques .and 
frameworks and , therefor e ,  leave interpretation to the 
reader. This i s  not the case, in as far as interpretation 
is concerned , with the periodicals o f  Soviet origin . 
As with most governmentally sponsored publ ication s ,  
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press and New Times are 
representative of the Soviet point of view. The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press is a weekly issue of repr·inted 
texts of Pravda and Izuestia and as such give an official 
view of the Soviet position on a number of developments of 
Ostpolitik. Of particular importance is the availability 
of both this publication and New Times for a detailed 
account of international developments . Even though New 
Times is more l i terarily oriented than the document-based 
Current Digest,  they both serve to elaborate on Soviet 
reaction. In contrast to these two publ ications , · Problems 
of Communism is an American publication devoted primarily 
to an American point of view to developments in the Communist 
world. It is similar to the other two in 1ts degree of 
slant in commen ts , even though they are in opposite direct.ion� 
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Easily accessible and of great usefullness are the 
publ ications of West German sources translated in English. 
Weekly publications of the Press and Information Office are 
The Bulletin and The German Press Review. While the former 
u t i l izes a format of editorials of the government press 
service, i t  also becomes useful in issuing documentary 
texts of agreements and treaties which are often made into 
separate booklets a t  later dates . These issues , usually 
supplement s ,  contain official government publ ications of 
texts of important international developments . The latter 
of the two publ icat ions is made weekly by the German Embassy 
in Washington D. c. , and i s  a propaganda too l ,  to some extent, 
for the Federal Repub l i c .  Even though they present excerpt 
comments from many German newspapers , they could be taken 
out of context by the editors of the Press Review. 
This is not the case with The German Tribune , which 
i s  a West German publ ication translated in English . The 
weekly paper claims to be po l i t i cally non-partisan and 
seems to have been that in as much as I can tell . The 
German Tribune reprints complete texts o f  articles appear­
ing in many German newspapers , ranging . from liberal to 
conservative and Catholic to Protestant. This affords a 
broad spectrum o f  exposure of the reader to German editorial 
opinions. 
The last category of major consequence is that of 
- 1 20-
primary sources. Through compilations of speeches and 
materia l ,  and from official governmental publications in 
�est Germany of treaties and protocols and statistics there 
i s  ava ilable a vast amount of material for analy s i s .  These 
range from private speeches of W i l ly Brandt to the texts 
of the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties and documentations of 
Erfurt and Kassel . I f  a researcher has need of a sourcebook 
other than indexes , I would recommend A Bibliogr aphy of 
German Studies ; 1945- 1 97 1 ,  edited by Loui s  F .  Helbig. A 
1 9 7 2  publication of the Institute of German Studies at 
Indiana University,  Bloomingto n ,  Indiana and compiled by 
Gisela Hersch, this can serve as a ready source of infor­
mation on many aspects of German affairs. 
